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COMMENT
THE DEATH OF SELECTIVE WAIVER: HOW NEW FEDERAL RULE
OF EVIDENCE 502 ENDS THE NATIONALIZATION DEBATE
Patrick M. Emery*
ABSTRACT
New Federal Rule of Evidence 502 (“FRE 502”) will end the three-
decade push to nationalize a corporate litigation protection known as the
“selective waiver doctrine.” First adopted by the Eighth Circuit in 1978, the
selective waiver doctrine holds that, when a corporation discloses privileged
materials to a government agency during an investigation, the corporation
retains its privileges against third-party litigants—i.e., the corporation may
selectively waive its attorney-client privilege (and in other circuits its attorney
work product protection). This flies in the face of traditional waiver rules,
under which a waiver of privilege to one’s adversary generally is a waiver to
all adversaries on that subject matter.
Based on years of frustration with discovery costs, fear of corporate
fraud, and heavy burdens placed on administrative agencies, many legal
scholars praised selective waiver as a cure for those ills. Recently, when the
Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules met to discuss additions to the FRE,
many called for the inclusion of a selective waiver provision. After much
debate, the Advisory Committee determined that the selective waiver proposal
for FRE 502 was too controversial. In its enacted form, FRE 502 does not
contain a selective waiver provision.
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This paper: 1) addresses the problems that led to the resurgence of
selective waiver commentary; 2) tracks the development of the selective
waiver doctrine; 3) relates and analyzes the debate at the committee level for
the proposal of FRE 502(c) Selective Waiver; 4) discusses FRE 502 as
enacted; and 5) raises questions about the future application of FRE 502.
As this comment will demonstrate, the jurists and federal circuit courts
that reject the doctrine have proven too strong an obstacle for selective waiver
proponents. Nevertheless, in its current iteration, FRE 502 addresses some of
the concerns raised by selective waiver supporters. Most notably, FRE 502
protects corporations from total subject matter waiver when it makes a
genuinely inadvertent disclosure of privileged material to an agency. Along
with the recently reintroduced Attorney Client Privilege Protection Act, FRE
502 potentially represents a step toward the protection of corporate
evidentiary privileges in agency investigations and in future litigation against
third parties. In the end, FRE 502 will have to affect change without a
nationalized waiver provision since it will never materialize.
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1. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1423 n.7 (3d Cir. 1991).
I. INTRODUCTION
Selective waiver permits a “client who has disclosed privileged
communications to one party to continue asserting the privilege against other
parties.”  There are many reasons for the revival of the selective waiver1
doctrine as a proposal for a new Federal Rule of Evidence (“FRE”).
Correspondingly, there are various reasons for the proposal’s demise at the
committee level. This paper will address the discussion surrounding selective
waiver and argue that the decision to abandon a selective waiver proposal for
a FRE 502 was the proper choice. Moreover, this comment will discuss the
proposed and enacted forms of FRE 502 and ruminate over its potential effect
on the corporate litigation milieu.
This paper is divided into four main segments. The first section of this
paper discusses the current corporate litigation climate and the reasons for the
resurrection of the selective waiver doctrine, which are many. First, a rise in
corporate fraud in the past decade increased the desire for improved federal
investigations and led to more cooperation by business organizations with
agencies. Second, the enforcement practices of federal agencies are believed
by many to impinge upon the corporate attorney-client privilege. Third, the
rising cost of discovery, in terms of time and money, has raised concerns
about the ability of corporations to protect their evidentiary privileges against
inadvertent disclosures. Finally, the circuit split on selective waiver (though
most reject the doctrine) has caused uncertainty and incongruous application
of privilege waiver rules.
To understand the impetus for protecting corporate privileges, the second
section of this paper briefly presents the principles behind evidentiary
privileges and their corresponding waivers. First, the section covers attorney-
client privilege, its application in the corporate setting, and how it is
traditionally waived. Second, the section deals with attorney work product and
the ability of a party to waive its protections.
Rather than discussing the application of selective waiver in the courts as
a subsection of the “reasons for the resurrection of selective waiver,” this
article will discuss that subject under its own heading. Therefore, the third
area of this comment covers the development and nearly universal rejection
of selective waiver in the federal circuits and in state courts.
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2. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush Signs H.R. 6456 and S. 2450 into
Law (Sept. 20, 2008), available at http://federalevidence.com/pdf/2008/09-Sept/WhiteHouse
200809201.pdf.
3. Andrew J. McNally, Comment, Revitalizing Selective Waiver: Encouraging Voluntary
Disclosure of Corporate Wrongdoing by Restricting Third Party Access to Disclosed Materials, 35 SETON
HALL L. REV. 823, 833 (2005).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 823–24. McNally recognized that the issue underlying selective waiver is: whether it is
beneficial to expand the scope of privileges in the corporate context? Id. To him, the best formulation of
selective waiver would be a creation of a new corporate-government privilege in which a corporation that
disclosed privileged documents pursuant to a confidentiality agreement with an agency would be protected
from discovery requests submitted by third-party litigants. Id. at 828. In some ways, a nationalized selective
waiver rule would be an adoption of a new “corporate-government privilege.”
6. Id. at 834.
7. Letter from Brian G. Cartwright, General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission, to
Peter G. McCabe, Secretary, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, at 1–2 (Feb. 16, 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EV%20Comments%
Since courts inconsistently apply waiver privilege rules, selective waiver
proponents have resorted to legislative proposals, namely FRE 502(c). The
fourth section of this paper deals with the proposal for FRE 502(c) at the
committee level and the arguments raised during the comment period.
While proposed FRE 502(c) did not survive the comment period, FRE
502 passed both houses and was signed into law on September 19, 2008 by
President George W. Bush.  Its current iteration contains provisions dealing2
with selective disclosures to federal agencies during investigations. The fifth
final part of this comment explains the provisions of the FRE 502 bill and
raises questions about its effect in the future.
II. THE REASONS FOR THE REVIVAL OF THE SELECTIVE WAIVER DOCTRINE
A. The Corporate Entity: Past Malfeasance and the Current Climate
Corporations are legal fictions, a creation of state law, and only act via
their agents.  To retain the benefits of limited liability, corporate directors and3
officers must have compliance programs in place.  Manipulation by corporate4
insiders harms employees, shareholders, and the consumer public.  If a5
corporation suspects that its agents may have committed a crime, then
common practice and common law dictate that the corporation hire
independent outside counsel to investigate the problem.  The internal6
investigation reports generated in independent investigations are highly
informative and provide federal investigators with a roadmap for tracking
corporate fraud.  In many instances, increased cooperation between7
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202006/06-EV-062.pdf.
8. McNally, supra note 3, at 847.
9. Id.
10. In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
corporations and agencies leads to increased fraud prevention and penalization
of lawbreakers.
The Enron, Adelphia, and WorldCom scandals caused many to demand
an increase in cooperation between investigating agencies and business
entities.  Some looked to selective waiver as a method for increasing8
cooperation, which, they argue, would increase the chance that criminals will
be caught; this result, in turn, would cause a decrease in fraudulent activities,
increased compliance, and reduced agency costs.  Consequently, the current9
corporate climate has been a driving force behind the proposals for a
nationalized selective waiver rule.
B. Enforcement Practices of Federal Agencies: the “Culture of Waiver”
Ironically, the investigative practices of federal agencies have also led to
increased support by jurists and corporate counsel for selective waiver.
“Culture of waiver” is a term used to describe the fact that federal
investigators often demand the surrender of privileged corporate documents
in exchange for more lenient penalties, which leads some corporations to
believe that their attorney-client privilege and work product protection are
under attack. Commentators suggest that selective waiver would ameliorate
some of the problems associated with the exchange of privileged materials for
leniency. While selective waiver would not end agency demands for
privileged information, it would encourage corporations to cooperate since it
would prevent third-party litigants from obtaining those same materials
through traditional waiver rules.
1. Securities and Exchange Commission
Initiated in the 1970’s, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (the
“SEC” or the “Commission”) Voluntary Disclosure Program provided
corporations the chance to avoid formal investigation and litigation in return
for self-investigation and complete disclosure to the agency.  Continuing that10
practice, in 2001, the SEC issued the “Seaboard Report,” which encouraged
government officials to seek privilege waivers from corporations and made
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11. American Bar Association, Governmental Affairs Office, Independence of the Legal Profession:
Attorney-Client Privilege, Work Product, and Employee Legal Protections, Overview (2009), available
at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/. See also Press Release, Securities and
Exchange Commission, Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and Comm’n Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions
(Oct. 23, 2001), at ¶ 11 & n.3, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm.
12. “Thompson Memo”: Letter from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, U.S.
Department of Justice, to Heads of Department Components and U.S. Attorneys, at 7 n.2 (Jan. 20, 2003),
available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2003jan20_privwaiv_dojthomp.pdf
(citing former U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(g)).
13. American Bar Association, Governmental Affairs Office, Independence of the Legal Profession:
Attorney-Client Privilege, Work Product, and Employee Legal Protections, Key Points (2009), available
at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/.
14. Id.
15. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
16. 542 U.S. 956 (2004). Zach Dostart, Comment, Selective Disclosure: The Abrogation of the
Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 723, 755 (2006).
17. American Bar Association, Governmental Affairs Office, Independence of the Legal Profession:
waiver of privilege a condition for receiving cooperation credit.  Over the11
past four decades, the SEC has maintained its approach, which some accuse
of eroding corporate attorney-client privilege since the tactic places
corporations between Scylla and Charybdis: does a corporation surrender its
privilege to lessen the potential ill-effects of an SEC prosecution and risk
vulnerability to third-party suits, or does it circle the wagons?
2. Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Formerly, the Federal “Sentencing Guidelines reward[ed] voluntary
disclosure and cooperat[ion] with a reduction in the corporation’s offense
level.”  In a 2004 amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines, the New12
Commentary stated that § 8C2.5 “authorizes and encourages the government
to require entities to waive their attorney-client and work product protections
in order to show ‘thorough’ cooperation with the government and thereby
qualify for a reduction in the culpability score—and a more lenient
sentence—under the Guidelines.”  Before the amendment, the (old)13
Commentary did not mention a “requirement” of waiver for an organization
to obtain clemency.  This all changed when the Supreme Court held that14
mandatory sentencing guidelines are unconstitutional in United States v.
Booker  and in United States v. Fanfan.  Consequently, in April of 2006, the15 16
Sentencing Commission unanimously voted to remove the privilege waiver
commentary from the Sentencing Guidelines; the amendment is now
effective.  Since the Sentencing Guidelines are now advisory, incarcerations17
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Attorney-Client Privilege, Work Product, and Employee Legal Protections, Status (2009), available at
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/.
18. Dostart, supra note 16, at 755.
19. Id. at 755–56.
20. Katherine M. Weiss, Upjohn v. United States as Support for Selective Waiver of the Attorney-
Client Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 48 B.C. L. REV. 501, 502 (2007).
21. Id.
22. “Holder Memo”: Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of
Justice, to All Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys, at 1 (June 16, 1999), available at
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/1999jun16_privwaiv_dojholder.pdf.
23. Id. at 2, I.A.–B.
24. Id. at 3–4, II.A.4.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 6–8, VI.
and monetary penalties for criminal corporate acts are flexible.  Nevertheless,18
federal prosecutors still can press less-harsh charges against white-collar
criminals and federal juries still can consider whether a white-collar criminal
cooperated with the government in determining sentencing.19
3. Department of Justice (U.S. Attorney’s Office)
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) upheld the right of federal
prosecutors to seek attorney-client privileged material in criminal
investigations,  which means that prosecutors may consider a corporation’s20
willingness to cooperate in determining appropriate criminal charges.
Correspondingly, the DOJ reduces the sentences and fines sought when a
corporation cooperates.  The following paragraphs include a history of DOJ21
policies in the past decade.
In 1999, the DOJ’s Holder Memorandum enumerated factors for the
federal prosecution of corporations that informed prosecutors whether and
how to charge an investigated corporation.  The “Holder Memo” first22
addresses some of the purposes of prosecuting corporations and their
employees: to encourage self-policing and self-remediation, general
deterrence, specific deterrence, and protection against public harm.  The non-23
exclusive list of factors to be considered in charging a corporation includes
whether a corporation timely and voluntarily discloses wrongdoing and its
willingness to cooperate in the investigation.  Cooperation involves, if24
necessary, waiver of corporate attorney-client privilege and work product
protection.  While the memo repeatedly cautions that these factors are25
discretionary, the letter gives lengthy treatment to how waivers of privilege
should be construed.26
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27. Id. at 6, VI.B.
28. Id. at 7, VI.B. However, reductions in charges may not be appropriate in cases of widespread
fraud or crime. Id.
29. Id. Under the Holder Memo, waivers are to be limited to the factual internal investigation of the
corporation and contemporaneous advice given to the corporation on the central issue. Waivers are not to
be sought “with respect to communications and work product related to advice concerning the government’s
criminal investigation.” Id. at 14 n.2.
30. Id. at 7, VI.B.
31. Id. at 8, VI.B.
32. Id. at 10–12, IX–XI.
33. Id.
34. Thompson Memo, supra note 12, at 1.
The Holder Memo cites several obstacles to thorough agency
investigations, including corporation size, split lines of authority within
corporations, transhumance within corporations, and changing personnel
within corporations.  In exchange for corporate cooperation, which can assist27
governmental attorneys in surmounting these obstacles, prosecutors may offer
immunity, reduced sanctions, or amnesty, but only when timely cooperation
is deemed necessary to the public interest and other methods of obtaining
information is ineffective.28
While the instruction to utilize a method of securing waivers in exchange
for leniency is limited to “appropriate circumstances,” the Holder Memo
advocates assessing the adequacy of a corporation’s cooperativeness by the
completeness of its disclosure, which includes voluntary privilege waiver.29
Waivers permit agencies to acquire statements of “witnesses, subjects, and
targets without having to negotiate individual cooperation or immunity
agreements.”  Importantly, the memo reminds prosecutors that the bargaining30
chip is in their hands: a corporation’s offer to cooperate does not
automatically entitle it to immunity, and a corporation should not be able
avoid liability for the organization by using its directors, officers, and
employees as scapegoats.  Under the Holder Memo, the prosecutorial31
endgame turns on balancing the purposes of federal prosecution of
corporations with the enforcement method chosen.  Although waiver of32
privilege is a factor in corporate cooperation, which can lead to leniency,
waiver of privilege alone will not result in sanction avoidance if the objectives
of deterrence, compliance, and public protection are not fulfilled.33
In 2003, Larry D. Thompson issued a memorandum, revising the mandate
of the Holder Memo and its tactics against corporate fraud.  The “Thompson34
Memo” exhorted prosecutors to be vigilant for corporate strategies employed
to avoid exposure of wrongdoings—tactics that include impeding
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35. Id.
36. Id. at 8.
37. “McCallum Memo”: Letter from Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Acting Deputy Attorney General,
U.S. Department of Justice, to Heads of Department Components and U.S. Attorneys, at 1 (Oct. 21, 2005),
available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/files/AttorneyClientWaiverMemo.pdf.
38. Id.
39. American Bar Association, Governmental Affairs Office, Independence of the Legal Profession,
Status (2009), available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver.html. The ABA feared
a lack of uniformity or “token restraints” on prosecutors in demanding waivers. Id.
40. “McNulty Memo”: Letter from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of
Justice, to Heads of Department Components and U.S. Attorneys (Dec. 12, 2006), available at
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/.
41. Id. at 1–2.
42. Id. at 1.
investigations while purporting to cooperate and establishing “paper
programs” instead of proactive self-policing mechanisms for internal
investigations.  Other examples of investigation obstructions include:35
instructions to employees not to cooperate fully; making misleading
statements or omitting pertinent information; incomplete or delayed record
disclosure; and failure to seasonably reveal known violations.  The substance36
of the privilege waiver discussion in the Thompson Memo differs little from
that of the Holder Memo, but the Thompson Memo’s emphasis on alertness
to corporate wagon circling suggests that the DOJ fell victim to corporate
chicanery during investigations in the preceding interim.
On October 21, 2005, Acting Deputy Attorney General Robert D.
McCallum, Jr. issued another memorandum, titled “Waiver of Corporate
Attorney-Client and Work Product Protections.”  The “McCallum Memo”37
instructed all U.S. attorneys to initiate “a written waiver review process for
your district or component.”  The problem with the McCallum Memo was38
that it did not “establish any minimum standards for, or require national
uniformity regarding, privilege waiver demands by prosecutors.”39
In response to clamor raised by the American Bar Association and other
interested parties, the DOJ revised the Thompson Memo and supplanted the
McCallum Memo with a letter by Paul J. McNulty, the Deputy Attorney
General.  Citing four years of “unprecedented success” in fraud prosecution,40
the “McNulty Memo” supersedes its predecessors, but reaffirms the basic
tenets of the former manifestos.  The impetus for the McNulty Memo arose41
from complaints that DOJ practices discouraged “full and candid
communications between corporate employees and legal counsel”—the very
purpose of the attorney-client privilege.  Gone from the list of factors to be42
considered by prosecutors was any reference to the willingness of a
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43. Id. at 4.
44. Id. at 8–11.
45. Id. at 8.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 9. Collateral consequences include disproportionate harm to innocent shareholders,
pension holders and employees and the impact on the public arising from the prosecution, counterbalanced
by the nature, seriousness, and pervasiveness of the criminal activity (i.e., is it an accepted and known
business practice within the company). Id. at 4.
49. Id. at 9.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
corporation to waive privilege.  Nevertheless, the McNulty Memo gives43
extensive treatment to its plan for privilege waivers under VII. “Charging a
Corporation: The Value of Cooperation,” subsection 2. “Waiving Attorney-
Client and Work Product Protections.”44
The McNulty Memo emphasizes that privilege waivers are not a
prerequisite to determining that a corporation cooperated with investigators.45
Finding that privilege waivers expedite agency processes and enable the
government to determine the completeness and accuracy of disclosures, the
McNulty Memo states that a prosecutor may only request a waiver “when
there is a legitimate need for the privileged information to fulfill their law
enforcement obligations.”  Desirability and convenience are not to be46
considered elements of “need.”  Need depends on: 1) the likelihood and47
degree to which privileged information will benefit the investigation; 2)
whether information can be obtained in a timely and complete manner by
utilizing other means; 3) “the completeness of the voluntary disclosures
already provided”; and 4) “the collateral consequences to a corporation of a
waiver.”48
To secure privileged information, the McNulty Memo recommends a
multi-step approach, starting with the “least intrusive waiver necessary.”49
Before issuing a waiver request, “prosecutors must obtain written
authorization from the U.S. Attorney, who must provide a copy of the request
to, and consult with, the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division
before granting or denying a request.”  Any request must contain an50
explanation of “need” and the scope of the waiver sought.  All waiver51
requests must be maintained in the files of the U.S. Attorney.  If the request52
is authorized, then the U.S. Attorney must send a written waiver request to the
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53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 10.
56. Id.
57. “Category II” does not include: 1) “legal advice contemporaneous to the underlying misconduct
when the corporation or one of its employees is relying upon the advice-of-counsel defense”; or 2) legal
advice or communications in furtherance of a crime or fraud, coming within the crime-fraud exception to
the attorney-client privilege.” Id. at 10. Those exceptions fall under “Category I” in step one. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 11.
61. Letter from David Brodsky, Preserving the Attorney-Client Privilege, to Peter G. McCabe,
Secretary, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
at 2 (Apr. 19, 2006), available at www.uscourts.gov/rules/Brodsky.pdf.
62. American Bar Association, Governmental Affairs Office, Independence of the Legal Profession:
Attorney-Client Privilege, Work Product, and Employee Legal Protections, Key Points (2009), available
at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/.
corporation.  The corporation’s response to the waiver request may be53
considered in evaluating its cooperativeness.54
The first step in the McNulty waiver process permits prosecutors to seek
only factual information.  In “rare circumstances,” if the investigation is55
hampered by incompleteness, a prosecutor may seek attorney-client
communications or non-factual attorney work product.  The second step56 57
follows a similar procedure to the first step, but there is one key distinction:
if the corporation declines the request to waive privileges under step two, the
“prosecutors must not consider this declination against the corporation in
making a charging decision.”  In spite of this, the former statement is58
mitigated by the fact that a prosecutor may “always favorably consider a
corporation’s acquiescence to the government’s waiver request” in
determining cooperativeness.  Finally, waiver requests never need to be filed59
after a corporation voluntarily offers its privileged documents without a
formal written request by the government.60
On paper, the McNulty Memo throws roadblocks in the path of agency
attorneys who seek privilege waivers; however, in practice, the McNulty
Memo exacerbated the “culture of waiver.”  To this day, DOJ attorneys61
routinely seek privilege waivers and encourage “voluntary waivers” by
corporations so that they can avoid the McNulty waiver process, and
corporations often comply.  As will be discussed infra, waivers of privilege62
in the absence of a full McNulty waiver process are more salient to our
discussion than the choice of DOJ attorneys to evade the necessary
prerequisites.
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63. For more information, see Lance Cole, Revoking Our Privileges: Federal Law Enforcement’s
Multi-Front Assault on the Attorney-Client Privilege (And Why It Is Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REV. 469
(2003).
64. Kenneth S. Broun & Daniel J. Capra, Getting Control of Waiver of Privilege in the Federal
Courts: A Proposal For Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 58 S.C. L. REV. 211, 214 n.9, citing FED. R. CIV.
P. 16(b)(6) advisory committee’s note (discussing 2006 amendment); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(4) advisory
committee’s note (discussing 2006 amendment).
65. Id. at 215 & n.10.
66. Id. at 216 and nn.17–18.
67. Id. at 217. Some suggest that corporations have “little choice” between cooperating with
agencies, in exchange or leniency, and withholding privilege documents to preserve the privilege. See
Weiss, supra note 20, at 502. However, many argue that corporations take a calculated risk in disclosing
certain information to the government: gain leniency, but risk loss of privilege protection against third
parties.
68. Letter from Keith Altman, Director of Adverse Event Analysis, Finkelstein & Partners, to Peter
G. McCabe, Secretary, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, at 1 (Jan. 14, 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EV%20Comments%
202006/06-EV-034.pdf. In Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, 205 F.R.D. 421, 425–26
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), “a case involving the production of e-mail, the cost of pre-production review for
privileged and work product material would cost one defendant $120,000 and another defendant $247,000,
and that such review would take months.” ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES, 109TH CONG.,
[REVISED] REPORT ON THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, COMMITTEE
In the end, many believe that the investigatory tactics of the SEC, DOJ,
and other agencies has led to a “culture of waiver” that deprives corporations
of their attorney-client privilege, and something must be done about it.63
C. The Discovery Predicament: Document Review and Production Risks
In a time where discovery poses limitless obligations on parties involved
in complex litigation, it is crucial to recognize that disclosing parties often
make mistakes. Inadvertent disclosures of privileged information are common
and find their source in the expense and time-consuming nature of document
review. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognize “claw back” and
“quick peek” agreements between parties as efficient bulwarks against
disclosures of privileged information.  While these agreements bind the64
parties, such protective measures afford no defense against non-parties.65
Finding waivers for inadvertent disclosures and broad scope waiver for
intentional disclosures provides incentive for corporations to closely monitor
disclosures.  This leads to a thorny choice for corporations: expend energy66
and finances to scour all documents for privileged information or risk losing
protection.67
Expensive and time-consuming discovery is not only an issue for
producing parties.  Often, the receiving party is saddled with a bevy of68
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NOTE, at 8 (June 30, 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Excerpt_EV_Report_Pub.pdf.
69. Altman, supra note 68, at 1.
70. “For example, on a hard drive costing $300, I can store 1,200 filing cabinets of paper documents
or 12,000 filing cabinets of electronic documents.” Id. at 2.
71. Id.
72. Id.
documents from the producing party—sometimes as an attempt to snow-in the
opposition.  While the costs of analysis for the receiving party can be69
enormous, storing costs are negligible.  However, receiving parties often copy70
the entire electronic library so that all parties to the case have complete copies,
which means that when a producing party asks for a return of information,
perhaps due to an inadvertent or sloppy disclosure, up to twenty electronic
databases: 1) need to be returned to a central location; 2) have their index
erased; and 3) have the privileged information erased. Similarly, all paper
copies must be located and destroyed.  Keith Altman estimates the cost of71
this process at $5,000–$10,000 per return request in a complex multi-firm
litigation.72
The current corporate environment, coupled with the expense of
discovery and pressure from agencies to surrender privileged materials, leaves
corporations uncertain about the status of their attorney-client and work-
product privileges. To protect these privileges, to encourage cooperation with
the government, and to save everyone time and expense, many have turned to
the doctrine of selective waiver as their savior.
III. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE IN
CORPORATE LAW
To understand the selective waiver proposal and why it failed, it is
important to recognize the value and the nature of the privileges for which
corporations seek protection. Moreover, an appreciation of the principles
behind evidentiary privileges and the reasons for the traditional waiver rules
associated with those privileges is salient to recognizing that selective waiver
is inconsistent with the notions of equality and fairness that reinforce our
adversarial system.
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73. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
74. Id.
75. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 50, quoting United States. v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
78. Id., citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
79. Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules: Hearing on Proposal 502, 109th Cong., 26 (Apr. 24, 2006)
(statement of James Robinson).
80. Id. Robinson identified the fact that corporate directors and investors have the benefit of doing
business in the corporate vehicle, including limited liability. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386.
A. Attorney-Client Privilege: Principles, Application, & Waiver
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest privilege in common law.  The73
purpose of the privilege is to encourage full and frank communication between
lawyers and clients, which promotes the public interests of observance of law
and administration of justice.74
FRE 501 recognizes the authority of federal courts to develop testimonial
privileges,  attorney-client privilege in particular. In enacting the FRE,75
Congress rejected nine additional privilege proposals and implicitly left the
development of privileges to the courts.  In general, “[t]estimonial76
exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that
‘the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence.’”  Accordingly,77
evidentiary privileges are “strictly construed” and accepted only to the extent
that the permitted exclusion of relevant evidence furthers a public policy goal
that trumps the principal objective of trials—the ascertainment of truth.  For78
decades, the circuit courts have demarcated the scope and application of
attorney-client privilege and its waiver. The creation of new evidentiary
privileges is reserved to Congress’ discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b).
The “scope and contours of [corporate privileges] are different in
important respects” from individual privileges.  Corporations are creatures79
of state creation and do not enjoy the constitutional protections against self-
incrimination that individuals possess.  Corporate attorney-client privilege80
protects individual employees who confide in corporate counsel only as long
as the corporation continues to invoke the privilege.  Employees have no81
standing to object to a corporate waiver; a corporation has control over waiver
since it has significant exposure for the acts of its employees.82
In Upjohn,  the Supreme Court clarified the function of the attorney-83
client privilege in the corporate sphere. Before Upjohn, the circuits were split
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over the application of the attorney-client privilege in relation to
corporations.  One approach, known as the “control group” test, privileged84
communications between corporate attorneys and executives who could
participate in decisions regarding corporate legal matters.  Another approach,85
named the “subject matter” or “Harper & Row” test, privileged a
communication if: 1) it was between a corporate attorney and an employee of
the corporation; 2) the employee’s supervisor(s) directed the employee to
make the communication; and 3) the subject matter of the communication
involved the employee’s duties of his employment.  Before Upjohn, corporate86
attorneys either chose to interview lower-level employees and risked exposing
that information to third parties for lack of privilege or chose not to interview
lower-level employees and risked failing to uncover potential illegalities.  A87
major consideration in the Court’s decision was the fact that, since all
employees can get a corporation into legal trouble, it is necessary for
employees to have open lines of communication with corporate attorneys.  By88
ending the control group test and adopting the “subject matter test” in Upjohn,
the Supreme Court ensured that corporate attorney-client privilege promotes
compliance with the law and encourages self-policing.89
Waiver of attorney-client privilege in corporate cases traditionally occurs
when: 1) the party claiming privilege sought to use it in a way that is not
consistent with the purpose of the privilege; 2) the party had no reasonable
basis for believing that the documents would be kept confidential by the entity
receiving the disclosure; and 3) waiver of the privilege would not hurt the
policy elements inherent in the privilege.  Since evidentiary privileges are90
strictly construed, a party can easily waive its attorney-client privilege through
an intentional, and sometimes an inadvertent, disclosure.
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B. Attorney Work Product Doctrine: Principles, Application, & Waiver
Hickman v. Taylor  established the framework for the work product91
doctrine, which protects attorney work product from discovery in litigation.92
The “strong public policy” underlying the work product doctrine was
reaffirmed in United States v. Nobles  and substantially incorporated into93
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).  Some elements of Hickman still control attorney94
work product not covered by Rule 26(b)(3).95
In Hickman, the Supreme Court discussed the development of discovery
techniques and the necessity of discovery.  The goal of discovery is to narrow96
and clarify the issues for trial or for settlement.  Primarily, discovery97
techniques, such as depositions and interrogatories, help parties ascertain facts
about the case so that trials are not an exercise in surprise and are not
conducted with parties “in the dark.”  Through discovery, “[c]onsistent with98
recognized privileges,” parties can “obtain the fullest possible knowledge of
the issues and facts before trial.”99
The tools of discovery, interrogatories in particular, are designed to
extract information from the other party, not their lawyer.  Since a lawyer’s100
memoranda, statements taken, and mental impressions are not protected by
attorney-client privilege, the Court in Hickman determined that it needed to
protect those items from discovery.101
Historically, lawyers worked in private, and privacy has been deemed an
essential facet of the adversary system.  While the facts of the case are102
public domain, “inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would develop
in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial” if
attorney work product was discoverable.  Therefore, the Court created the103
work product doctrine to protect attorney work product fabricated in
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anticipation of litigation from discovery.  With the burden of proof on the104
party seeking discovery, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) limits that doctrine’s
application to items that could not be obtained without undue hardship,
information that is inaccessible, or if the circumstances would place an unjust
burden on the party seeking the information. Consequently, the protection of
the work product doctrine is not absolute.
The scope and application of the work product doctrine, just like attorney-
client privilege, is left to courts to determine, especially in applying both Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) and Hickman as a two-pronged protection of attorney work
product. The following case discusses waiver of work product protection.
The D.C. Circuit faced a unique waiver problem in United States v.
AT&T.  The court first found that MCI had a right to intervene in litigation105
between AT&T and the government.  MCI sought intervention to stop the106
government from delivering to AT&T information protected by the work
product doctrine that MCI gave to the government in an earlier
investigation.  The documents were considered work product because MCI107
prepared the documents in anticipation of its antitrust lawsuit against
AT&T.  Since MCI was admitted as a party to the litigation between the108
government and AT&T, it could assert work product protection.109
The issue of whether a disclosure of work product to a party in a related
litigation constitutes a waiver of protection to all parties in the litigation
initially turned on the issue of “common interests.”  If parties share a110
common interest in the litigation or are co-parties and their fates in the
litigation may turn on the success or failure of the other party, then those
parties may share materials traditionally protected by the work product
doctrine without waiving that privilege, typically under a joint defense
agreement.  After all, the purpose of work product protection is to prevent111
adversaries, not the world, from obtaining sensitive material.  However, if112
a disclosure is inconsistent with the purpose of maintaining secrecy from an
opposing party or if a disclosure substantially increases the risk that an
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opposing party will obtain the information, then the protection is waived.113
Therefore, unlike a waiver in the case of attorney-client privilege, voluntary
disclosure of material protected by work product doctrine typically will not
lead to a waiver of the privilege as to all parties.114
Since the court did not constrict “common interests” in the litigation to
co-parties, and since MCI and the government shared a common interest in
their antitrust suits against AT&T, the court held that MCI’s disclosures to the
government did not constitute a waiver of work product protection.  The115
standard for waiver of attorney work product is not the same in all circuits, but
MCI expounded the basic principles for waiver of work product protection.
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SELECTIVE WAIVER DOCTRINE
Selective waiver first appeared in federal courts in the late 1970’s, but
garnered little support thereafter. Below is a non-exhaustive, chronological
survey of the doctrine’s reception at the federal and state levels, mostly hitting
the highlights. More importantly, these cases illustrate typical examples of
corporate fraud, agency investigations, third-party suits, and privilege waiver
issues.
A. Origin of Selective Waiver in the Eighth Circuit
The selective waiver doctrine originated in the Eighth Circuit.  In116
Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, in a rehearing en banc, the court
found that materials protected by both attorney-client privilege and the work
product doctrine do not lose their protection from discovery after disclosure
to a government agency.  The underlying suit involved two companies,117
Diversified and Weatherhead, who formerly had a business relationship, under
which Weatherhead purchased copper from Diversified.  In 1974 and 1975,118
Diversified became embroiled in two lawsuits in federal court.  The lawsuits119
revealed that Diversified might have created a “slush fund” that it used to
bribe purchasing agents of other companies, including Weatherhead; the fund
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was also used for other unlawful purposes.  That information attracted the120
attention of the SEC, who investigated Diversified and later filed suit for an
injunction against the company.121
Weatherhead sued Diversified in federal district court for unlawful
conspiracy between Diversified and its own employees, tortious interference
with contractual relationships, and violation of the Clayton Antitrust Act.122
During the discovery phase, Weatherhead sought many documents from
Diversified that would normally be protected by attorney-client privilege and
the work product doctrine.123
The prior litigation involving Diversified settled before the SEC’s
involvement.  Shortly thereafter, Diversified’s board of directors initiated an124
investigation into the company’s business practices.  In early 1975,125
Diversified employed outside counsel to lead its internal investigation and
report its findings to the board.  The law firm was not retained to represent126
Diversified in future litigation, but solely employed to investigate potential
misconduct within the company.127
The internal investigation generated reports that contained information
about past employee behavior that would be useful if turned over to an
opposing party, but would normally be protected by attorney-client privilege
and possibly the work product doctrine.  When the SEC investigated128
Diversified’s activities in the copper market, Diversified gave the reports
prepared by outside counsel to the SEC pursuant to a subpoena.129
Weatherhead sought production of the same documents, relying on the
traditional rule that once a client waives attorney-client privilege to one party,
it waives the privilege to all entities on that issue.130
Since Diversified disclosed the documents “in a separate and nonpublic
SEC investigation,” the Eighth Circuit concluded that “only a limited waiver
of [attorney-client] privilege occurred.”  The court reasoned that a waiver of131
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the privilege following a release to a government agency would deter
corporations from hiring “independent outside counsel to investigate and
advise them in order to protect stockholders, potential stockholders and
customers.”  The “limited waiver” doctrine announced by the Eighth Circuit132
in Diversified is now commonly termed “selective waiver.”  As shown in the133
next section, the Eighth Circuit blazed a path that few circuits have followed.
B. Reaction against Selective Waiver in the Circuits
1. D.C. Circuit in Permian134
The D.C. Circuit fired the first salvo at the selective waiver doctrine in
Permian v. United States. The case concerned litigation between Occidental
Petroleum Corporation and Mead Corporation over Occidental’s proposed
exchange offer for shares of Mead.  Mead opposed the proposal and sued135
Occidental.  The litigation involved the production of millions of documents136
pursuant to discovery requests and multiple claims of privilege and
confidentiality.137
Meanwhile, Occidental was under an informal investigation by the SEC,
which inquired into the legitimacy of Occidental’s registration statement for
the exchange offer.  Occidental released 1.2 million pages of documents to138
the SEC, which negotiated with Occidental to obtain previously discovered
and organized documents that Mead had obtained from Occidental.  Pursuant139
to a confidentiality agreement, Occidental allowed the SEC to obtain certain
privileged documents.  Mead gave the thirty-six documents in issue to the140
SEC with Occidental’s knowledge.  Shortly thereafter, the Department of141
Energy (the “DOE”) sought documents from the SEC for use in its
investigation against Permian, a subsidiary of Occidental.  Occidental142
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objected, claiming that its confidentiality agreement with the SEC protected
its privileged information, but the SEC communicated its intention to transmit
the documents to the DOE and the main litigation commenced.143
At the outset, the D.C. Circuit based its analysis on the principle that the
“legal significance” of a corporation’s “arrangements for the question of
waiver depends on the nature of the privilege asserted.”  While courts144
traditionally hold a “strict standard of waiver in the attorney-client privilege
context,” courts often utilize a “more liberal standard” of waiver for attorney
work product.  Accordingly, the court held that Occidental waived its145
attorney-client privilege when it sent documents to the SEC that would have
been protected by attorney-client privilege.146
Citing the Fourth Circuit,  the D.C. Circuit rejected Occidental’s request147
that it apply the selective waiver rationale of Diversified.  The court stated148
that selective wavier would not further the purpose of attorney-client privilege
of keeping confidentiality between attorney and client.  Moreover, although149
cooperation with the government is laudable, attorney-client privilege should
not be a “tool for selective disclosure” since it already inhibits the “truth-
finding process.”  A client should not be able to “pick and choose” among150
his enemies for selective disclosure of privileged information when it suits
him.  Occidental willingly surrendered the privilege in order to expedite the151
SEC’s approval of the exchange offer, and, in doing so, knowingly risked
waiving the privilege.  Accordingly, the court held that Occidental could not152
prevent the sharing of the formerly privileged information between the SEC
and the DOE.153
On the issue of work product, the court determined that Occidental had
not waived its protection since the district court’s finding that the work
product was protected under a confidentiality agreement was not clearly
erroneous.  Later, the D.C. Circuit held that a corporation could waive its154
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work product protection by disclosing documents to a government agency in
exchange for leniency.  Oddly, the Eighth Circuit, which fashioned selective155
waiver in the context of attorney-client privilege, concurred with the D.C.
Circuit’s conclusion on disclosures of attorney work product.  Since a156
purported “common interest” in a settlement does not neutralize the act of
disclosure between adversaries, the Eighth Circuit held that parties who
disclose work product to adversaries in settlement negotiations waive work
product protection.157
2. Second Circuit in John Doe Corp.158
The Second Circuit also rejected the selective waiver doctrine in the
context of attorney-client privilege disclosures.  The attorney-client privilege159
is an exception to the duty of citizens to reveal relevant evidence in litigations,
but it does not shield communications serving purposes other than those that
are judicially recognized.  Once a corporation releases information for160
commercial purposes, no matter what the economic ramifications, the
privilege is lost, regardless of voluntariness, because the “need for
confidentiality served by the privilege is inconsistent” with divulgence.  Like161
the D.C. Circuit in Permian, the Second Circuit revolted at the idea that
clients could pick and choose among their adversaries for disclosures of
privileged information.162
3. D.C. Cir. in Subpoena Duces Tecum
Reaching the question again in 1984, the D.C. Circuit steadfastly held that
a corporation waived its attorney-client privilege by producing documents to
the SEC in response to the SEC’s Voluntary Disclosure Program, discussed
supra § II.B.1.163
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The D.C. Appeals Court found that a waiver of attorney-client privilege
is caused by three factors: 1) the party claiming privilege sought to use it in
a way that is not consistent with the purpose of the privilege; 2) the party had
no reasonable basis for believing that the documents would be kept
confidential by the entity receiving the disclosure; and 3) waiver of the
privilege would not hurt the policy elements inherent in the privilege.  The164
court articulated that, if a corporation were allowed to selectively disclose
privileged information, it would gain a “double advantage” from the
privilege—garnering both leniency from a government agency and protection
against a third-party litigant.  When a corporation discloses privileged165
information to an agency, for instance the SEC under its Voluntary Disclosure
Program, the corporation makes a calculated judgment that the advantage
gained by disclosing to the SEC is greater than the loss caused by waiving the
privilege for private litigants.166
As for the work product doctrine, the D.C. Court in Subpoena Duces
Tecum held that the corporation had also waived its privilege.  When a167
corporation is under investigation by the SEC, it is an adversary of the
agency.  Moreover, it would be unreasonable for a corporation to fail to168
anticipate suits by third parties following an SEC investigation.169
Additionally, it must be noted that in this case, as in many cases, the
government agency did not guarantee confidentiality.  Therefore, it is170
inconsistent and unfair to allow selective waiver of work product protection.
Finally, the D.C. Circuit added that if the SEC or Congress wants selective
waiver to apply to privileged information in government investigations, then
those entities should promulgate regulations or enact legislation to that
effect.171
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4. Fourth Circuit in Martin Marietta172
The Fourth Circuit muddied the waters of privilege in 1988 in case that
involved disclosures by a corporation to the Department of Defense and the
United States Attorney’s Office while they were the corporation’s
adversaries.  The court refused to apply selective waiver to documents173
formerly protected by attorney-client privilege that Martin Marietta released
to government agencies.  However, the Fourth Circuit’s discussion of work174
product doctrine postulated a new formulation of its protections.
The Fourth Circuit held that Martin Marietta waived its work product
protection for all non-opinion work product on the same subject matter when
it divulged certain documents to the government since the agencies were its
adversaries.  On the other hand, the court held that opinion work product175
would remain protected against discovery from third parties since: 1) opinion
work product gets great protection; and 2) the underlying rationale for the
doctrine of subject matter waiver has little application to the context of a pure
expression of a legal theory or legal opinion.  The differences arise from the176
fact that there is little risk that a lawyer’s theory or opinion will be used as a
sword and shield to distort the fact-finding process—dissimilar to selective
disclosure of non-opinion work product and especially unlike the
dissemination of information guarded by attorney-client privilege.  The177
Fourth Circuit supported its holding that selective waiver only applied to
opinion work product by citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), which recognizes a
distinction between opinion and non-opinion work product.178
5. Third Circuit in Westinghouse
The most influential early case against the application of selective waiver
in the corporate setting is Westinghouse. The Third Circuit first examined the
application of waiver to the attorney-client privilege, and found that, once a
client reveals information to a third party, the basic justification for the
privilege no longer applies.  Exceptions are recognized when disclosures are179
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necessary for obtaining legal advice, e.g. to a doctor, agent of the lawyer, or
co-litigant, but a strict standard of waiver is applied when the information is
given to adversaries and other third parties.180
Westinghouse argued for selective waiver for corporations who disclose
privileged information to government agencies, but the Third Circuit rejected
this request, stating that selective waiver has little to do with assisting a client
in obtaining legal advice.  Although the Third Circuit did not find the “pick181
and choose”  rationale or fairness argument of Permian convincing, the court182
agreed that selective waiver would take the privilege beyond its purpose of
encouraging open communications between lawyer and client.183
The Third Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has been reluctant to
recognize a privilege where Congress has considered the policies, but rejected
the privilege.  Previously, the SEC proposed and Congress rejected an184
amendment of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act that would establish selective
waiver for disclosures to the government.  However, even if the privilege185
aided government investigations, the privilege must “promote . . . sufficiently
important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence.”186
Weighing those considerations, the Third Circuit held that the need for
probative evidence outweighed the governmental interest asserted by
Westinghouse.  Westinghouse argued that public interest would be served187
by promoting corporate cooperation with government agencies and that this
could be accomplished best through selective waiver.  However, the court188
decided that there was no need to encourage corporations to cooperate with
the government since Westinghouse itself chose to cooperate by disclosing
privileged materials without expecting protection from selective waiver.189
The Third Circuit commented that selective waiver, if applied in cases of
privileged disclosures to government agencies, might violate the Freedom of
Information Act.  On a related issue, the court declared that a confidentiality190
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agreement would not protect a party from waiving its privilege in disclosing
documents to the government.  The court found that corporations do not191
have a reasonable expectation of confidentiality and that agency regulations,
which demand confidentiality during investigations, require documents to be
circulated on request (if publication is not contrary to public interest).192
Consequently, the Third Circuit held that a corporation waives its attorney-
client privilege as to third parties when it discloses privileged documents
during a federal investigation.193
As for the work product doctrine, the Third Circuit recognized the
differing applications of waiver in disclosures made to adversaries and
disclosures made to co-litigants.  Since Westinghouse was the target of194
multiple federal investigations, it clearly disclosed protected documents to
adversaries when it sent information to the DOJ and the SEC.195
Commensurately, the court held that a disclosure of work product to one
adversary constituted a waiver of the doctrine’s protection against all
adversaries.  The court based its decision on the principle that evidentiary196
privileges are to be strictly construed.  Moreover, since the work product197
doctrine recognizes qualified protection and can be overcome by a showing
of substantial need or hardship,  unlike attorney-client privilege, which gives198
absolute protection, the waiver test for work product doctrine cannot be more
stringent than for attorney-client privilege.  The court feared that199
independent outside counsel retained by a corporation for an internal
investigation might not fully investigate allegations of malfeasance if they
know that their work will always be disclosed to agencies to obtain
leniency.  Accordingly, the Third Circuit held that a voluntary disclosure of200
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attorney work product to an adversary constitutes a full waiver of work
product protection.201
6. Second Circuit in Steinhardt202
In 1993, the Second Circuit finally reached the issue of selective waiver
of attorney work product.  In Steinhardt, Steinhardt Partners made voluntary203
disclosures of attorney work product to the SEC during an investigation.204
The Second Circuit held that Steinhardt and the SEC were adversaries at the
time of the disclosure; therefore, Steinhardt waived its work product
protection.  The court limited its holding to the facts of the case, but noted205
the persuasive reasons against selective waiver.206
The Second Circuit agreed with other federal courts that a corporation
makes voluntary disclosures to the SEC and other agencies because it believes
that it can profit from those disclosures.  To support that idea, the court cited207
an amicus brief submitted by the SEC that stated that selective waiver is not
necessary for cooperation since many corporations cooperate without selective
waiver.  In addition, a corporation has incentive, based on leniency of208
treatment, to cooperate with the government regardless of whether a third
party can get access to the documents through discovery in a later litigation.209
Therefore, it is up to an investigated company to decide if the benefits
outweigh the risks of giving attorney work product to government agencies.210
7. Federal Circuit and First Circuit
Latecomers to the selective waiver discussion included the Federal
Circuit and the First Circuit. The Federal Circuit held that once attorney-client
privilege is waived, it is “waived for all purposes and in all forums.”211
258 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 27:231
212. M.I.T, 129 F.3d at 685.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 686.
215. Id. at 687.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 687–88. The court limited the waiver to the actual documents produced and did not
address the question of whether the waiver extended to all related documents. Id.
218. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2002).
219. Id. at 302.
220. Id. at 303.
221. Id.
Similarly, the First Circuit refused to apply selective waiver based on a policy
that predictability and ease of administration of cases comes with complete
and non-selective wavier.  The First Circuit preferred to leave the adoption212
of selective waiver to Congress since government agencies are supported in
their need for cooperation by the legislative branch, while the courts protect
client privileges.  Therefore, a corporation makes a foreseeable gamble when213
it chooses to disclose privileged information to a federal agency.214
Unlike other circuits, the First Circuit determined that it is harder to
waive work product protection than attorney-client privilege since work
product protection is waived only when information is disclosed to
adversaries.  Another rationale for this difference in treatment of waivers is215
the fact that attorney-client privilege protects its information absolutely, while
attorney work product is discoverable upon a showing of need under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(3).  Nevertheless, the First Circuit found that the defendant216
waived its work product protection when it gave documents to an adversarial
governmental agency.217
8. Sixth Circuit in Columbia/HCA218
Addressing the issue of attorney-client privilege waiver, the Sixth Circuit
rejected the selective waiver doctrine for privileged documents released to the
DOJ by Columbia/HCA.  The court reasoned that third-party litigants stand219
in the same position as the government in the truth-finding process and that
the government should not benefit from selective waiver in a way that inhibits
the truth-finding process.  Furthermore, the government should not inhibit220
the truth-finding process by hiding illegalities, especially when it is the
government’s responsibility to root out corporate misdeeds—not enter into
confidentiality agreements and give leniency to fraudulent actors.  Even if221
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the government has limited resources and time, it can still obtain the
information by other means.222
Upon reaching the issue of work product waiver, the Sixth Circuit
reached the same conclusion as the Eighth Circuit in Chrysler, holding that
Columbia/HCA waived its attorney work product protection by transmitting
documents to the DOJ.  The court noted that other than the requirement of223
disclosure to an adversary, the rationale for finding a waiver of attorney work
product differed little from the reasons supporting a waiver of attorney-client
privilege.224
9. Tenth Circuit in Qwest225
Today, the seminal case against selective waiver is Qwest since it came
after the Enron and WorldCom debacles, which renewed the fervor for
selective waiver.  Qwest again addressed the issue of whether a corporation226
waived attorney-client and work product privileges as to third-party civil
litigants by disclosing privileged documents to federal agencies during an
investigation.227
The DOJ and the SEC began investigating Qwest’s “business practices”
in 2002.  Qwest submitted documents under a subpoena and a written228
confidentiality agreement with each agency.  Overall, Qwest produced229
220,000 pages of documents protected by attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrine, but chose not to produce another 390,000 pages of other
privileged papers.  The Tenth Circuit christened this a perfect example of a230
corporation utilizing its privileges as a sword and shield, not only picking and
choosing between adversaries as to which would receive privileged
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documents, but also cherry picking the documents for which it waived
privilege.231
Prior to the investigations, several private suits were initiated against
Qwest, and more suits were brought after the investigations began.  In the232
civil suits, Qwest produced millions of pages of documents during discovery,
but refused to surrender any privileged documents, claiming that the
information remained protected.  Several litigants sought to compel233
production, and their motions were granted when the district court found that
Qwest waived its privileges by submitting the documents to the DOJ and the
SEC.  On appeal, the Tenth Circuit upheld the decision of the district234
court.235
After rehashing the history of the attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrine, the Tenth Circuit addressed the arguments of Qwest.  The236
court sensed that Qwest was not asking for an extension or amendment of old
privileges, but perhaps a grant of an entirely new privilege—a corporate-
government privilege.  Qwest claimed that selective waiver is necessary for237
a corporation to cooperate confidently and openly with the government.  The238
Tenth Circuit rejected this suggestion, admonishing that Qwest, like
Westinghouse before it, cooperated in the face of an overwhelming lack of
support for selective waiver in state courts  and the federal circuits.239 240
Moreover, the DOJ did not support Qwest’s assertion that selective waiver is
necessary for corporate cooperation, citing years of investigations without
assurances of privilege for investigated corporations.241
While the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that some federal circuits hold that
confidentiality agreements tip the scale in favor of selective waiver and that
Qwest had one in place with each administrative agency, the court concluded
that confidentiality agreements hardly restrict the government’s use of
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surrendered documents.  Often, documents are passed between agencies to242
facilitate investigations.  Moreover, the court recognized that the government243
frequently shares its findings with third parties.  In response, Qwest seemed244
to suggest that the onus for protection of privileged information rests with the
DOJ and the SEC once confidentiality agreements are consummated.  The245
Tenth Circuit gave no credence to this theory, finding it unfair to require an
agency to comb through 220,000 pages and cull information to ensure that
privileged information does not leave the confines of an enforcement office.246
After all, if corporate cooperation (stimulated by a guarantee of selective
waiver) is supposed to decrease the time and expense of investigations for the
government, then it would be counterproductive and counterintuitive to allow
a corporation to inundate an agency with documents and leave the duty of
redacting privileged information to the government.
The greatest problems that Qwest had in trying to convince the Tenth
Circuit to adopt selective waiver arose from the fact that Qwest’s situation did
not present facts that suggested any iniquity fell on Qwest for its waiver of
privileges. As stated above, Qwest hedged its bets by selectively disclosing
privileged documents to the government and not releasing another 170,000
protected documents.  Furthermore, although Qwest decried the practices of247
the DOJ and the SEC pursuant to their enforcement guidelines, there were no
facts to suggest that either agency coerced Qwest into surrendering privileged
documents, magnified by the fact that Qwest exchanged those documents for
lenient treatment from the agencies.  Since Qwest entered into a quid pro248
quo with the agencies and received value for its disclosures, the Tenth Circuit
rejected Qwest’s claim that it faced a Hobson’s Choice when it was
investigated.249
In general, the climate of corporate law in 2006 provided no support to
Qwest’s request for selective waiver.  The Tenth Circuit decided to leave the250
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decision of adding selective waiver to the list of corporate privileges to
Congress, noting that the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules already
proposed FRE 502 at that juncture.251
C. Reception of Selective Waiver in State Courts
State courts typically refuse to follow the selective waiver doctrine.252
Nolan Mitchell wrote an interesting article comparing how multiple state
courts treated the same defendant corporation under the same set of facts—a
corporation disclosed privileged information to a federal agency and third-
party litigants, suing in several states, sought discovery of those materials.253
Each state court rejected the doctrine of selective waiver in its application to
attorney-client privilege when it encountered its McKesson-HBOC case.254
However, interesting dissimilarities in treatment of selective waiver arose in
the work product context.  California and Georgia rejected selective waiver255
overall, while Delaware allowed selective waiver for work product.256
In 2004, a California appeals court rejected selective waiver protection
for both attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine.  Years earlier,257
while in the midst of a merger, McKesson discovered that its auditors
uncovered improper corporate activities.  The discovery led to shareholder258
lawsuits and investigations by the SEC and the U.S. Attorney’s Office (the
“USAO”).  Internal investigations produced several reports that the259
corporation shared with the SEC pursuant to a confidentiality agreement.260
McKesson believed that it had a common interest with the government in
rooting out wrongdoings.261
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The SEC took no action against McKesson; meanwhile, the USAO filed
criminal charges against several former HBOC executives.  Several civil262
actions were consolidated into a single case;  meanwhile, a multiplicity of263
cases continued in other states. The private litigants motioned to compel
production of the internal investigation reports that McKesson turned over to
the government.  The trial court granted the motions and the appellate court264
affirmed.265
The California appellate court quickly dismissed McKesson’s claim that
its attorney-client privilege had not been waived, finding that McKesson had
no common interest with the agencies and that its disclosures were not
necessary for its attorneys to provide sound legal advice, as would be in the
case of an individual sharing privileged information with a doctor.266
Additionally, the court was persuaded by the argument that it is unfair for a
defendant to pick and choose among its enemies.  As for work product, the267
California court found the confidentiality agreements unenforceable and
superfluous since the government had an interest in enforcement, not
confidentiality.268
McKesson’s work product protection claims received the same treatment
in Georgia. In McKesson Corp. v. Green,  the Georgia Supreme Court held269
that the objectives of stalling prosecution or hoping to obtain leniency from
an agency are foreign to the doctrine of work product protection. Moreover,
waiver does not hurt the doctrine since attorneys can still prepare cases in
confidence as long as clients and lawyers do not turn over their documents.270
By upholding selective waiver, outside counsel will know in advance that their
work will be surrendered, which means that sharp practices, which the
doctrine strives to eliminate, will develop.  Therefore, preserving waiver271
protection while disclosing attorney work product to the government actually
discourages attorneys from fully preparing cases.  Georgia’s Supreme Court272
also refused to recognize the efficacy of confidentiality agreements, which are
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“far from airtight” since agencies can turn over documents if it is in the
furtherance of their duties and responsibilities.273
As the McKesson cases demonstrate, for selective waiver to have uniform
application in all courts, thereby buttressing the utility of the doctrine,
Congress would have to enact a rule that preempts federal and state decisions
on corporate privilege waiver.
By 2006, hope was all but lost for a nationwide adoption of selective
waiver for in federal and state courts. Consequently, the battle shifted fields
from the courts to commentary and, finally, legislative proposals.
V. THE PROPOSAL FOR NEW FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 502274
Even though courts have nearly foreclosed any chance for the adoption
of selective waiver, the doctrine has survived in commentary for decades. The
imbroglio of fraudulent corporate activity in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s
related to Enron, Adelphia, and WorldCom led to the creation of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002,  which Congress designed to increase corporate275
responsibility and ensure the accuracy of public financial disclosures.276
Additionally, the act established the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board to fulfill purpose.  Following Sarbanes-Oxley’s enactment,277
innumerable commentators published articles in journals and posted
arguments on weblogs calling for the implementation of a nationwide
selective waiver rule. Those authors believe that selective waiver would
increase corporate reporting and remove any roadblocks for federal
investigators who sought privileged items that might contain revealing
material, such as internal investigation reports. The fervor blinded many to the
fact that selective waiver might, in the end, benefit the corporations that
committed the illegal acts more so than the investor public, government
agencies, and third-party litigants.
These next sections track the development of FRE 502 and provide a
reason for the failure of FRE 502(c) to garner a recommendation for
enactment.
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disclosures from a corporation to an agency since it is difficult to foresee what types of agreements would
A. A Short History of Proposed New Federal Rule of Evidence 502
The Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules met on April 24 and 25,
2006 at Fordham Law School in New York City to entertain a proposed
amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence.  The action item was Proposed278
Rule 502 on Waiver of Attorney Client Privilege.279
Drawing on years of dissatisfaction with the time, expense,  and effort280
demanded by complying with discovery requests, particularly in protecting
privileged information, the Committee sought to draft a rule to alleviate the
burdens of discovery.  The Committee unanimously approved the proposal281
and the accompanying note, and recommended its submission to Congress.282
The Judicial Conference of the United States met on September 18, 2007,
approved the recommendations of the Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, and approved the proposed addition of FRE 502.  Among other283
sections drafted by the Advisory Committee for comment, the selective waiver
section read:
502(c) Selective Waiver—
In a federal or state proceeding, a disclosure of a communication covered by the attorney-
client privilege or work-product protection—when made to a federal public office or
agency in the exercise of its regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority—does not
operate as a waiver of the privilege or protection in favor of non-governmental persons
or entities. The effect of disclosure to state or local government agency, with respect to
non-governmental persons or entities, is governed by applicable state law. Nothing in this
rule limits or expands the authority of a government agency to disclose communications
or information to other government agencies or as otherwise authorized or required by
law.284
After the comment period, the committee was unconvinced of the value and
effects of selective waiver, so it transmitted that proposed section to Congress
in brackets.285
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On December 11, 2007, Senator Patrick Leahy, Chair of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, introduced Senate Bill 2450, proposing the addition of
the new Federal Rule of Evidence 502.  The bill was scheduled for debate286
on February 25, 2008, and passed in the Senate by unanimous consent.  The287
bill passed the House of Representatives on September 8, 2008,  and was288
signed into law on September 19, 2008.289
B. Analysis of the Arguments Surrounding FRE 502(c) Selective Waiver at
the Committee Level
The Committee sent the selective waiver provision to Congress in
brackets to indicate that the Committee had no position on the merits of the
provision. At the time, the Committee asked for “statistical or anecdotal
evidence tending to show that limiting the scope of waiver will 1) promote
cooperation with government regulators and/or 2) decrease the cost of
government investigations and prosecutions.”  Numerous individuals and290
interest groups responded to the call. Below is a synthesis and analysis of their
arguments, organized by topic, which tends to show that better judgment
prevailed when the selective waiver provision was dropped from
consideration.291
The issues addressed in the letters to the Committee and discussed infra
include: 1) consistent application of privilege waiver rules in the courts; 2)
agency concerns; 3) corporate concerns; 4) furthering the purposes of
corporate attorney-client privilege; 5) fairness; 6) discovery burdens; 7)
confidentiality agreements & the Freedom of Information Act; 8) federalism;
and 9) who benefits from selective waiver?
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1. Consistent Application of Privilege Waiver Rules in the Courts
The disparate treatment of privileged disclosures in federal courts,
specifically in relation to work product waivers, stimulates much of the
discussion surrounding selective waiver.  Some corporate lawyers find it292
difficult to prepare cases for multiple jurisdictions, and the incongruous
rulings of the federal circuits on waiver issues makes that preparation more
complicated.  However, the best argument against a nationalized selective293
waiver rule is the fact that over half of the federal appellate courts already
rejected the proposal made for FRE 502(c).  If the committee recommended294
502(c) for legislation in the face of decades of circuit court precedent against
selective waiver, the committee would be “telling [twenty-four] federal
appellate judges from eight different circuits that their decisions were
wrong.”295
Codification of common privileges that have developed successfully over
thirty years in the courts is an unnecessary usurpation of powers that Congress
intentionally left to the courts.  Since courts respond to the “equities of296
individual cases rather than the special interests of lobbying groups,” the
development of privileges is best left to the courts.  Despite the fact that297
federal and state courts have almost entirely dismissed selective waiver, courts
already accommodate corporations through “protective orders, which
accomplish the same goal, but with judicial oversight.”298
All parties could benefit from the adoption of a consistent, nationwide
approach to privilege waiver through legislation. Uniformity could be
achieved by a rejection of selective waiver in every circuit, or a Supreme
Court decision to that effect, just as easily as it could through nationwide
adoption of selective waiver. As the arguments below demonstrate, selective
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waiver is not the best formulation of a national privilege waiver standard.
Therefore, uniformity would be better achieved through other methods.
2. Agency Concerns: Can a Reduction in Investigation Costs & Promotion
of Corporate Cooperation and Compliance be Achieved Through Selective
Waiver?
The SEC is primarily “responsible for administering and enforcing federal
securities laws, which are designed to protect investors and the integrity of . . .
capital markets.”  The bulk of the SEC’s resources are devoted to299
investigating possible violations of securities laws.  During investigations,300
the SEC frequently acquires privileged documents from regulated
organizations.  The SEC is most interested in the “reports and related301
materials prepared by retained counsel for companies conducting their own
internal investigations into potential past violations of the securities laws.”302
The SEC does not view waiver of privilege as an end, but as a means, when
necessary, to obtaining critical factual information from materials, such as
“memoranda of attorney interviews with company employees prepared as a
part of [an] internal investigation.”303
Like many agencies, the SEC staff of approximately 3100 does not have
the resources to pursue every hint of corporate malfeasance to the fullest.304
Richard Humes, drawing from his experience at the SEC in the General
Counsel Office, found that corporations hesitate to cooperate with the SEC
because they fear exposure to private litigation.  In his opinion, the305
documents produced by independent outside counsel during a corporation’s
internal investigation are the most helpful sources for the SEC to examine.306
For agencies, selective waiver would lead to swifter enforcement, save
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finances for agencies and corporations, encourage corporations to self-police
and self-report,  and help obtain “prompt relief for defrauded investors.”307 308
According to General Counsel Brian G. Cartwright, privileged
information has saved the SEC incalculable resources and time in over “100
significant” investigations over the past ten years.  This enabled the SEC to309
“bring cases faster and resolve them more expeditiously.”  For example:310
In a major, high-profile financial fraud investigation, counsel for the Independent
Directors Committee conducting the internal investigation devoted almost 50,000 to a
broad investigation of improper accounting at the company.  They reviewed nearly two311
million pages of documents, collected more than one million e-mail messages, and
interviewed more than 120 current and former company employees. They provided the
Commission staff with real-time progress reports of their investigations, binders
containing key documents for witnesses, and a detailed annotated version of their 340-
page investigative report. The information that the Commission obtained was extremely
valuable to the Commission’s investigation and the staff was able to benefit fully from
the work performed by dozens of attorneys and accountants conducting the internal
investigation.312
Cartwright assiduously acknowledges that the SEC must spend time and
money to verify the accuracy and completeness of the corporation’s internal
investigation, but “doing so is far less time-consuming and less difficult than
starting and conducting investigations without internal reports.”  Not only313
do the SEC and, by extension, taxpayers benefit from the disclosure of the
privileged information contained in internal investigation reports, but also
companies can benefit by limiting the number of executives and employees
whose testimony is sought by the Commission and by the agency’s enhanced
ability to determine whether it must pursue an enforcement action against the
company and its officers.314
Turning to the issue of selective waiver, Cartwright comments that
companies want to cooperate with the SEC by providing privileged
information, but they are concerned about waiving their privilege for third-
party litigants and often share less information with the agency.  Therefore,315
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the SEC believes that selective waiver would encourage companies to
cooperate by providing all factual information to the SEC.  However, the316
SEC desires that selective waiver protect the privilege holder’s
communications to the SEC even if the materials are used in open court,
disclosed to non-governmental personnel, or shared with other agencies by the
Commission.  Cartwright reasons that the SEC should be able to use the317
materials without waiving the privilege because the SEC is not the holder of
the privilege.  Although it is true that the agency cannot waive another318
party’s privilege by disclosing the information, that point is irrelevant because
the waiver, if at all, happens when the privilege holder makes the initial
disclosure to its adversary, the agency.
Advocates of selective waiver claim that nationwide adoption of the
doctrine would punish more criminal activity since it aligns the general
corporate interest in following the law and the government’s interest in
ensuring that corporations obey the law.  Primarily, full disclosure by319
corporations to the government benefits the public at large by enabling
agencies to punish criminals in a speedy and cost-effective manner.  This320
argument suggests that the proper way to procure compliance is to accelerate
the cleanup process, rather than at the front end of a transaction.  While321
selective waiver might encourage corporate cooperation with agencies (though
it is doubtful), thereby lowering the costs of investigations, selective waiver
does little to promote initial compliance with the law because corporations can
obtain lenient lighter punishments through cooperation credit.
The selective waiver doctrine embraces the theory that a corporation has
a lot to lose in admitting its own guilt and, often, a corporation gains little
benefit from government leniency in comparison to potential civil liability.322
Most jurisdictions refuse to recognize selective waiver, which means that third
parties can use discoverable, privileged disclosures to agencies as a “road
map” for civil suits.  Since corporations fear third-party litigants that can323
wield privileged documents against them, corporations are discouraged from
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cooperating with the government.  In turn, that leads to increased time and324
expense of investigations and fewer cases handled by the government.  It is325
suggested that with selective waiver the government could facilely target and
castigate corporate criminals, while reducing investigation costs; meanwhile,
corporations could enhance internal compliance and prevent future
misconduct.326
While working at the DOJ in 1999, James K. Robinson helped draft the
Holder Memo, which recognized that a corporation would be entitled to
cooperation credit when it gave privileged documents to the agency.  He327
responded to the American Bar Association’s (the “ABA”) claim that the
Holder Memo led to a culture of waiver and eroded privileges by stating that
corporations that want leniency from agencies should be expected to cooperate
fully.  In his mind, voluntary disclosures and internal corporate328
investigations lead to many prosecutions, many convictions, improved
compliance, and deterrence of criminal activity.  These ends spare the329
corporation and its shareholders disabling criminal prosecutions.  Robinson330
supports selective waiver because it would essentially destroy the barrier
between enforcement agencies and investigated corporations,  thereby331
bolstering the government’s interest in rapid resolution of investigations and
the shareholders’ interest in limiting their corporation’s exposure to
liability.332
The problem with the foregoing arguments is that they assume that an
increase in corporate cooperation is necessary when most corporations already
cooperate with government investigations, as cases like Westinghouse and
Qwest reveal.  It is naïve to think that corporations cooperate because they333
want to comply, when corporations actually submit privileged materials to
agencies for damage control—i.e., to obtain leniency.  Investigated334
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corporations complain that they have the unenviable choice between:
cooperating with an agency, which leads to leniency from the government and
increased exposure to third-party litigants; and not cooperating with an
agency, which leads to harsher governmental penalties, but less exposure to
third-party litigants. However, history and the following paragraphs show that
the choice is not so difficult—corporations should and do chose to cooperate
with the government since leniency is almost guaranteed, but a waiver to
third-parties does not automatically disgorge the value of that lenient
treatment since third-parties still have to prove their case against the
corporation.
Early in the proposal process, the Advisory Committee requested
comments that would impart “any statistical or anecdotal evidence.”  Cyril335
V. Smith responded to the entreaty by submitting a report on his experience
representing “targets, subjects, and witnesses in federal white-collar
investigations.”  In his career, the “risk of broader subsequent waiver for336
non-governmental parties has never been a factor in the ultimate decision
whether or not to disclose information to a prosecutor or regulator”—which
would mean the culture of waiver is partly a perceived problem.  Mainly,337
disclosing parties only ask, not demand, the government for assurances that
the information will not be disclosed to third parties.338
Smith’s comment includes a cost-benefit analysis that a corporation might
employ in the face of an agency investigation.  In one instance, a qui tam339
plaintiff, formerly employed by M&T Mortgage Corporation, filed suit against
M&T’s residential mortgage unit alleging that employees “forged the
signatures of both sellers and buyers on loan documents for federally-insured
mortgage loans.”  After the lawsuit was unsealed, M&T performed an340
internal investigation to appease HUD and fend off a suspension from the
residential mortgage underwriting enterprise.  M&T interviewed employees,341
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reviewed documents, and executed other typical investigatory measures.342
Then, M&T submitted a comprehensive documentation of its “investigatory
findings and conclusions to date.”  The incentive for M&T’s disclosure was343
that under HUD’s program, M&T had the right to be a direct endorser of
residential mortgage loans, which meant that “M&T could guarantee federal
insurance on a loan without a time-consuming underwriting review by
HUD.”  If investigators found fraudulent activity occurring within M&T’s344
residential mortgage unit, M&T could lose that concession.345
During the discovery phase of the qui tam action, the trial judge found a
waiver as to the investigation report submitted to HUD, and in a subsequent
proceeding, the magistrate ruled that there had been no broad “subject-matter
waiver as to the underlying investigative materials.”  The result of the case346
was that M&T evaded adverse regulatory action while making only a partial
disclosure to the plaintiff in the qui tam case.347
Contrary to what many selective waiver promoters argue, Cyril Smith’s
report on the M&T case exemplifies that the threat of prosecution to a public
company is “so great that the business’ first priority is always to attempt
resolution of the criminal investigation,” which means that “no further
incentive is necessary” to encourage cooperation with government agencies.348
Consequently, businesses have an ever-present motivation to cooperate, which
means that the government’s investigation and prosecution costs would not
decrease substantially from the slight increase in corporate cooperation that
selective waiver would bring.  Therefore, since it is unnecessary to promote349
cooperation, selective waiver would provide a windfall to business
organizations and do little to decrease the workload of the SEC.350
274 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 27:231
351. Brodsky, Preserving the Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 61, at 2.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 2–3. “A recent survey administered jointly by the Association of Corporate Council—an
organization representing nearly 19,000 public companies—and the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers found that nearly 75% of both inside and outside counsels state that in their experience,
government agencies expect a company under investigation to waive legal privileges. 1% of in-house
council and 2.5% of outside council disagreed with that statement. Of the respondents that confirmed that
they or their clients had been subject to investigations in the past five years, approximately 30% of in-house
council and 51% of outside council said that the government expected waiver in order to engage in
bargaining for treatment that is more lenient. And of those who had been investigated, 55% of outside
council said that the privilege waiver was requested either directly or indirectly. 27% of in-house council
confirmed that experience.” David Brodsky, Address at Fordham University School of Law, Advisory
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3. Corporate Concerns: Ending the “Culture of Waiver”
The ABA has outspokenly condemned the “culture of waiver” that has
developed over the last few decades.  David Brodsky claims that the “culture351
of waiver” erodes the corporate attorney-client privilege and threatens its
viability.  Since the privilege promotes legal compliance, ensures effective352
advocacy, provides access to justice, and promotes the proper function of the
adversary system, the ABA opposes routine use of securing waivers to unearth
criminal activities.  With the government already designedly attacking353
attorney-client privilege by using waiver of privilege as a prerequisite for
leniency, selective waiver would exacerbate the already coercive environment
by removing the “voluntariness” from waivers, in effect creating an
expectation of attorney-client privilege surrender.354
Brodsky argues that any selective waiver rule must be adopted outside of
a culture of waiver.  Fortunately, there are signs that the government may be355
changing its strategies for discovering corporate malfeasance.  However,356
until agencies manifest a tactical change, waivers will continue to undermine
client confidentiality and candor.  Lawyers will be excluded from operating357
in a preventative, rather than reactive manner.  Worse, lawyers will take358
fewer notes in meetings for fear of privilege waiver and risk being called as
a witness against their own corporation.  This creates a veritable conflict of359
interest between attorney and client and discourages corporations from
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seeking assistance from outside counsel.  Since internal investigations are360
still a crucial tool for curbing criminal activity, the corporate attorney-client
privilege must be protected to ensure compliance with the law and proper self-
reporting.  Finally, Brodsky complains that selective waiver only puts a361
band-aid on injuries caused by harmful government policies, effectively
destroying the voluntariness of waivers.  While speaking before the362
Committee at the Fordham Law School Hearing, Brodsky responded to an
audience member’s question, “realistically, how is this culture of waiver going
to change,” by stating that the culture of waiver would not change “any time
soon.”363
To avoid privilege waiver demands, companies can self-report in a
manner that provides all necessary information to the SEC or DOJ without
disclosing privileged documents.  Some highly regulated industries, wherein364
government officials “already have the authority to review all corporate
documents” at any time, might be good candidates for independently adopted
rules of selective waiver that only cover certain industries.  For instance,365
Section 607 the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006 grants
selective waiver to banks and financial services organizations that must
routinely disclose any information to regulators upon request.  Similar366
circumstances may also dictate a necessity for selective waiver, but these
additions can be made to the governing statute and need not be adopted
nationwide.  Perhaps under the Public Company Accounting Oversight367
Board standards adopted after Sarbanes-Oxley, selective waiver could be used
to protect corporate privileges when they turn over documents to auditors,
who must seek all materials to ensure the veracity of corporate records and
accounts.  These small-scale selective waiver rules would pinpoint problem368
industries and not cause the ill effects of a nationalized selective waiver rule
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that would fail to meet public policy goals, would legitimate agency waiver
tactics, and would compel corporations to relinquish privilege in almost all
situations.369
A few years ago, the ABA backed a different measure to end the culture
of waiver: a reintroduction of the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act
(ACPPA), which was reintroduced by Senator Arlen Specter on July 12,
2007.  After a debate on August 1, 2007, the House of Representatives370
passed H.R. 3013 by a voice vote on November 13, 2007. A Senate
Companion bill, S. 3217, was introduced in the 110th Congress, but “failed to
receive a vote.”  The bill was reintroduced as S. 445 in the 111th Congress371
on February 13, 2009.372
Almost all commentators in the selective waiver discussion demand the
end to the “culture of waiver.” The proposed ACPPA of 2007  would373
prohibit federal prosecutors from requesting disclosure of privileged
information and using assertion of attorney-client privilege or work product
protection as a factor in determining if the corporation has cooperated with a
federal investigation.  This means that a prosecutor could not consider374
cooperativeness in charging a corporation or its agents with lawbreaking,
which presumably removes some government leniency.
The bill proposes to reverse not only the trend of agency action that has
created the “culture of waiver,” but also prevent future application of similar
tactics. However, the ACPPA would do little to encourage corporate
cooperation with government agencies and voluntary disclosures.
Nevertheless, since we know that corporations have cooperated with agencies
in the absence of selective waiver, and even in this coercive environment,
there are no facts to suggest that corporations would stop cooperating with
agencies if they did not receive cooperation credit; they simply would not
disclose as much privileged information. True, enactment of the ACPPA
would not end the debate about selective waiver, but it would alleviate some
of the maladies of the culture of waiver.
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4. Furthering the Purposes of Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: Open
Communication Between Attorney and Client and Encouraging Self-Policing
and Compliance with the Law
In Upjohn, the Supreme Court expressed three concerns about corporate
attorney-client privilege:  1) predictability as to what communications will375
be disclosed to third parties;  2) promotion of free communication between376
attorney and client;  and 3) encouragement of corporate self-policing and377
cooperation with regulatory investigations.378
Several courts have held that selective waiver would hinder the attorney-
client privilege purpose of encouraging compliance with the law. Qwest holds
that selective waiver might inhibit the free-flow of information from
corporations to government agencies since officers and employers might be
less forthcoming with their attorneys if it were all but guaranteed that their
notated statements would be transmitted to the SEC or DOJ.  Katherine379
Weiss opines that this is “speculative” and that selective waiver promotes
internal investigations since it removes disincentives against collecting
information by providing additional protections against disclosure to private
litigants.  Her argument, concurred with by others, fails to address the fears380
of Qwest. Stating that corporations will be encouraged to self-police does
nothing to make employees be more forthcoming with sensitive, potentially
incriminating information. The government may get increased disclosures
from companies, but the veracity of those disclosures could diminish.
Like Brodsky, Theodore B. Van Itallie, Jr., Associate General Counsel at
Johnson & Johnson, argues that selective waiver will exacerbate the culture
of waiver and defeat the purpose of attorney-client privilege by destroying
confidence between corporate clients and corporate attorneys.  Itallie381
decided that the main “issue is not whether investigative expenses are [saved
by selective waiver], but whether the negative impact of selective waiver on
the impulse to seek legal advice is too high a price to pay for any reduced
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government . . . costs.”  Further, he posits that legal compliance is best382
achieved through sound legal advice provided by corporate counsel to
inquiring corporate clients at the outset.  “[E]nforcement [cannot] yield the383
same degree of legal compliance as encouraging business leaders to seek
advice about how to conform business conduct with the law.”  Accordingly,384
while selective waiver might lead to better enforcement, the destruction of
attorney-client confidentiality will decrease compliance overall and possibly
lead to a greater need for enforcement.
5. Fairness: Privileges Preserve the Integrity of the Adversarial System
The central fairness argument, which did not sway the Third Circuit in
Westinghouse, but did inform the decisions in other circuits, holds that
corporations cannot and should not use the attorney-client privilege as a
tactical weapon.  Consequently, if selective waiver is adopted, then385
corporations will selectively disclose to the government, as Qwest did, and be
allowed to pick and choose among its enemies, which may include other
agencies.  Weiss suggests that, like a decision to surrender privileged386
documents, an assertion of waiver is often a calculated decision, even if the
goal is to protect attorney-client communications.  Moreover, she avers that387
enforcing privilege against private litigants does not leave them any worse off
than they would have been if the corporation had not disclosed privileged
information to the government.  By this, Weiss means that private litigants388
would not have access to privileged corporate materials under normal
circumstances and that selective waiver not only increases the celerity of
criminal prosecutions, but also selective waiver would not take away anything
that private litigants would obtain without any privilege disclosures.
Proponents of selective waiver have not overcome the problems of the
“pick and choose” or the “sword and shield” uses of privileged information.
Courts often hold that privileges cannot be used selectively to block one party
from penetrating attorney-client confidentiality, but to curry favor by
disclosing that information to another party. Since third party litigants have
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nothing to offer corporations, unlike the government, they cannot hope to
garner the same information from corporations.  Essentially, selective389
disclosure creates an unequal access to material facts.
In addition, the justification for the privilege lies in the fact that it is an
acceptable obstacle in the truth-finding process.  To balance the loss390
maintained by courts (not having access to everyone’s information), the trade-
off is that client must keep a strict curtain of confidentiality—otherwise, it is
impossible to know if a corporation has disclosed all of the truth. That is what
justifies waiver: privilege should not be a negotiable commodity.  The391
adversarial system is based on equality, and that parity is destroyed when
adversaries are treated asymmetrically in a proceeding—remember, the
government is an adversary of the corporation. Ideally, rules should be applied
“equally to all who come before the before the court.”  Although selective392
waiver would benefit the government and corporations, it would “deny equal
treatment to all other litigants.”393
6. Could Selective Waiver Lessen the Burdens of Discovery?
Selective waiver apologists bolster the doctrine by arguing that it will
lessen the burden of discovery costs. Some, including Corporations
Committee Business Law Section of the California Bar, have responded to
that claim by asserting that litigation over discovery requests will increase
with the adoption of selective waiver.  In comments submitted to the394
Advisory Committee, members of the California Bar raised several questions,
which, if unanswered before enactment of the selective waiver doctrine,
harbinger continued litigation over selective waiver.  First, the proposed395
selective waiver rule was not written to protect routine disclosures that
agencies demand outside of the prosecutorial-context.  Second, the proposal396
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assumed that the best remedy for the culture of waiver is to protect further
disclosures to third parties rather than eliminating the pressure for initial
disclosures to the government. Finally, the selective waiver rule would worsen
the culture of waiver since corporations will have no excuse not to comply
with enforcement requests for privileged documents.  Consequently, while397
a corporation might not spend as much money on document review and
redaction, it will increase its costs of physical production. Moreover, this
might allow corporations to simply dump their entire database on the
government, which would increase the costs of document review for agencies
in finding the relevant information.
Waiver of privilege sometimes acts as a disincentive for lazy production
in that a party is punished for failing to perform due diligence and protect its
own privileges. To be equitable, truly inadvertent disclosure should not be
punished, but selective waiver goes beyond protecting companies from
completely losing their privileges through inadvertent disclosures; it protects
companies who make intentional disclosures to the adversary who offers the
best quid pro quo. Selective waiver will not reduce the burden or expense of
the discovery process and will remove the disincentive for lazy production that
traditional waiver rules provide.  Furthermore, any lack of clarity in a398
nationalized selective waiver rule would lead to increased litigation between
corporations, private litigants, and the government.  Although a rule that399
protects a corporation from subject matter waiver when it inadvertently
produces privileged material might not reduce discovery costs, it would keep
the disincentives provided by traditional waiver rules.
7. Confidentiality Agreements & the Freedom of Information Act
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) might present some problems
for the secretive use of privileged corporate materials by administrative
agencies through selective waiver.  “[E]xisting law affords agencies some400
authority to withhold another person’s or entity’s privileged and protected
information in response to a request from a private party.”  In theory,401
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privileged information falls within Exemption 7(A) as long as there is an
“open investigation, and thereafter it will come within Exemption 4.”402
Exemption 7(A) protects “‘information compiled for law enforcement
purposes’ to the extent that it ‘could reasonably be expected to interfere with
enforcement proceedings.’”  Agencies can use Exemption 7(A) to withhold403
documents categorically.  Documents from internal investigations would404
normally come under Exemption 7(A).  Exemption 4 covers matters that are405
“trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person
and privileged or confidential.”  Exemption 4 would normally protect406
information that would be protected by selective waiver, “although some risk
exists.”  Therefore, the SEC and others opine that selective waiver would not407
hider a proper discharge of the agency’s duties under the FOIA.
Some parties who commented on the FRE 502(c) proposal recommended
that any national selective waiver rule should state that the government can
use information obtained through confidentiality agreements in whatever
manner it sees fit.  These types of suggestions may align with proposals for408
inter-agency sharing of released materials. However, the argument for
unmitigated government usage echoes the confidentiality agreements that were
not upheld in Qwest and other cases.  Loose confidentiality agreements,409
which allow the government to employ privileged materials in any manner,
have been held to provide no protection to corporations and no assurances that
the agency will not publicize the information or release it pursuant to a third-
party’s discovery request.  Indeed, such a clause would not support the410
purpose of a selective waiver rule.
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In his comment, Paul R. Rice queries: what will happen to privileged
disclosures to government agencies once the prosecution ends?  If411
administrators obtain privileged materials from a corporation, presumably, the
agency will utilize those documents in proceedings against the corporation.412
During or following the prosecution, those documents indubitably will be
made public, and the confidentiality will be lost.  Is this a “temporary413
preservation” of privilege or will the information, once public, be deemed
inadmissible against the corporation in a civil suit brought by a third-party
litigant?  Perhaps a court order protecting the information from third-party414
use would be a practical solution.
It is possible that an agency could fulfill its duties under the FOIA if
selective waiver doctrine were adopted. However, the fact that agencies
routinely share the information received from corporations with other agencies
and the fact that confidentiality agreements are not airtight might undermine
selective waiver’s purpose of keeping information from third parties.
8. Federalization: Constitutional Preemption Issues
Without universal applicability, selective waiver would be useless.415
Professor Timothy Glynn published a 2002 article on the basic case for why
federalizing the law of attorney-client privilege would be a valid exercise of
Congress’ Commerce Clause powers and would not offend the Tenth
Amendment.   He insists that the argument from his 2002 article would416 417
apply in the current discussion.  Indeed, the Committee for FRE 502 thought418
that it could bind litigants in state court with a congressionally adopted rule
of privilege.  However, there may be problems with principles of federalism419
2009] THE DEATH OF SELECTIVE WAIVER 283
420. Id. at 245 & 262.
421. Id. at 240.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id. at 241 & n.217, and see Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2003).
425. Id. at 243.
426. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
427. Id. See also Mitchell, supra note 253, 727–28, citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1
(1984) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act had preemptive effect based on Congress’ power to enact
substantive rules under the Commerce Clause, even in absence of mention of preemption of state law in the
FAA itself). However, Mitchell argues that any selective waiver legislation must express an intent to bind
state courts as well to be effective, especially since the FRE apply only to federal courts. Id. at 739.
428. Id. at 738, quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464.
429. Broun & Capra, supra note 64, at 243.
430. Id. at 244.
431. Mitchell, supra note 253, at 738.
in adopting a national privilege law, which would be an expansion of federal
privilege-making power.420
The Rules Enabling Act (“REA”) grants Congress the sole right to adopt
new evidentiary privilege rules.  Any such enactment covers all federal421
courts under Article III of the Constitution.  To ensure that a privilege rule422
would cover parties not under agency investigation, Congress must implicate
its Commerce Clause powers under Article I of the Constitution.423
There are many examples of the ability of procedural rulings in federal
courts to have a binding effect on litigation in state courts. Federal courts have
the power to issue protective orders covering trade secrets, and these orders
have been universally followed.  Federal court rulings on the preclusive424
effects of litigation control in state courts.  Hanna v. Plumer  holds that,425 426
pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress can enact rules under
the REA that fall between substance and procedure.  Under Hanna, “the test427
must be whether a rule really regulates procedure, the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy or redress for disregard or infraction of them.”428
Additionally, the principle of federal supremacy has been applied to state
procedural rules where federal substantive law is preemptive.  These facts429
suggest that any federal court rule purporting to bind third parties would have
to be procedural.430
Problems for congressional preemption arise from the fact that privilege
law is not purely procedural.  During the adoption of 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b),431
Representative William L. Hungate stated that Congress must control the rules
of privilege because privileges “reflect a substantive policy choice between
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competing values, and this policy choice is legislative in nature.”  The432
reasons for privilege law being substantive derive from the REA and the Erie
Doctrine.  Privilege rules are designed to protect individual substantive433
interests that the state has regarded as more significant than free access of all
to everyone’s information.  Nolan Mitchell found that the Supreme Court434
has never determined if attorney-client privilege is substantive or procedural,
but claims that the privilege is substantive under the Hanna v. Plumer test
because it creates rights independent of those at issue in the underlying
claim.435
Paul R. Rice suggests that Congress has no power to bind state courts
with a FRE.  First, attorney-client privilege is not a constitutional right and436
is procedural in nature.  Second, it is debatable whether the attorney-client437
relationship is “commerce” within the meaning of the Commerce Clause.438
Finally, since attorneys are licensed, regulated, and controlled by state law,
determinations on the privilege itself logically should be controlled by the
common law in any jurisdiction, including federal courts.  Along the same439
line, the Center for Constitutional Litigation has found that only 3% of all
litigation occurs in federal courts.  Therefore, litigation is primarily a440
function of the states, and the federal government should only interfere with
the development of common law in “compelling circumstances.”441
Fundamentally, CCL argues that regulating litigation privileges has nothing
to do with “commerce” and that selective waiver is not “necessary” for proper
functioning of federal courts.442
Another quandary could arise as a potential conflict of laws.  Since state443
courts customarily follow their own rules of procedure, including evidentiary
rules, and most states do not recognize the selective waiver doctrine, state
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courts may not follow FRE 502; meanwhile, a federal court sitting in the same
state could reach an opposite conclusion when presented with the same
facts.444
Additionally, Russell J. Wood and Bruce R. Deming, Co-Chairs of the
State Bar of California’s Business Law Section, argue that jurisdictions will
not apply federal selective waiver uniformly since FRE 502 likely would not
preempt state law.  First, the admission and regulation of attorneys is445
historically a state-run enterprise.  “The states have a compelling interest in446
the practice of professions within their boundaries, and . . . as a part of their
power to protect the health, safety, and other valid interests they have broad
power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the
practice of professions.”  Second, California, like other states, has adopted447
rules for evidentiary privileges.  Therefore, FRE 502 “intrudes on an area448
traditionally regulated by the states within the scope of their police powers.”449
Intrusion through federal preemption may occur in limited
circumstances.  First, Congress can preempt state laws when a statute450
specifically expresses its preemptive intent.  Second, Congressional451
preemption can be implied under the doctrine of “field preemption” “where
it is clear from the statute and surrounding circumstances that Congress
intended to occupy the field, leaving no room for state regulation.”452
Congress has not demonstrated an intent to preempt this field in the past.453
Third, state law can be preempted under “obstacle preemption” if the state law
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.”  In light of these theories, Congress’454
ability to preempt state regulation of attorney activity is unconfirmed.455
Congress must clearly and manifestly express its preemptive purpose since
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courts would be unlikely to find that Congress could occupy a field controlled
for a century or more by the states and unlikely to hold that attorney-client
privilege is an obstacle to any Congressional agenda.456
Congress is the only entity that can bind all parties in all courts to
selective waiver.  To achieve uniformity, federalization is necessary, and457
Congress must make its preemption explicit in the statute if selective waiver
is to be effective.  Without overriding state courts, which have been largely458
unreceptive to the idea of selective waiver, corporate privileges would be
retained in federal court but will be lost to private litigants who successfully
file actions against corporations in state court.
9. Selective Waiver: Who Benefits From Its Adoption and Who Loses?
Selective waiver proponents have raised an argument that is a pareto
optimal: no person can be made better off without another being made worse
off.  This argument assumes that a corporation will never disclose without459
selective waiver.  If that is true, private litigants will be in no worse position460
than they would have been if the disclosure had not been made.  Meanwhile,461
society as a whole benefits from a speedy resolution to government
investigations.  Although a cost-benefit analysis is impossible to compute for462
this issue, some assert that the social benefits of selective waiver for all
corporations outweigh the advantages gained by a few third-party litigants
who now benefit in the absence of the doctrine.  However, since463
corporations often disclose privileged information without the protection of
selective waiver, which is the exact opposite of the basic assumption of the
argument, the pareto optimal has little thrust.464
Greg Joseph believes that the problem is not that corporations live in a
culture of waiver, but that they live in a “culture of settlement.”  He465
characterized attorney-client privilege as a “litigation privilege” that is
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468. Hackett, supra note 364, at 4. It is debatable whether the government would actually benefit
from selective waiver since corporations already comply with requests for the surrender of privileged
information.
469. McNally, supra note 3, at 855. Limited preference for administrative agencies in some
investigative matters is not a sufficient justification for unequal access to privileged materials that would
be available to all adversaries of a corporation under traditional waiver rules.
470. Id. at 827 and 839.
471. Id. at 855.
472. Adherents of selective waiver might retort that if selective waiver was in place then the
government could serve public interest to its fullest, though it is doubtful that this is correct.
irrelevant because few people are willing to try cases anymore.466
Corporations have primarily made the push for selective waiver, and some
suggest that “regulated industry is not in a position to be disputing with the
regulator whether . . . it is going to waive privilege if that is going to be a
condition of its ongoing business.”  While that statement is debatable, it467
highlights the fact that corporations would benefit most from the adoption of
a national selective waiver rule. Additionally, agencies generally supported
FRE 502(c) since the rule appropriates court authority to make privilege
determinations and legitimizes the practices established by the McNulty
Memo and Seaboard Report.  As a result, third-party litigants are the ones468
left out in the cold.
When it comes to corporate malfeasance lawsuits, not all litigants are
treated equally —i.e., the government has some tools at its disposal, such as469
subpoenas, that private litigants do not. Selective waiver supporters argue that
selective waiver will not hurt private litigants, who could obtain similar, non-
privileged information through other discovery techniques.  However,470
selective waiver supporters fail to appreciate the advantage gained by
corporations under selective waiver in comparison to the loss sustained by
third parties.
Private litigants, who include individuals and other corporations, can
vindicate public interest along with the government, but selective waiver
adherents claim that the government is better suited to serve the public
interest.  This logic is flawed for two reasons. First, if support for selective471
waiver is based on the belief that agencies are too understaffed and
underfinanced to investigate all corporate fraud without selective waiver, then
the government must not be able to serve the public interest to its fullest.472
Second, illegal actions by corporations harm individuals and other business
entities, not the “public interest.” True, the government serves the societal
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477. Letter from Steven B. Singer, Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann L.L.P., to Peter G.
McCabe, Secretary, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the United
States, at 1–3 (Feb. 14, 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EV%20Comments%202006/06-
EV-057.pdf.
goals of punishing criminal acts and deterring future illegalities by prosecuting
companies, but others often seek remuneration for the economic injuries they
have suffered. Even if agencies were not understaffed and underfinanced, only
third parties could seek redress for their own claims since the government
infrequently levies pecuniary penalties against corporations for the benefit of
bilked investors and those who were defrauded in business transactions.
Some commentators argue that private litigants do not sue in public
interest, but sue for self-gain since their goal is damages, unlike the
government, which sues to prevent future illegal acts.  In particular, McNally473
states that since the government has the exclusive ability to levy criminal
penalties, agencies should receive special treatment.  The government may474
have the ability to exact criminal punishment on officers, employees, and
corporations, but there is no reason to further safeguard corporations, which,
after all, committed the misdeeds that instigated the lawsuits, while providing
little advantage to the government, which already receives cooperation from
corporations.  The fact that federal business fraud laws contain private rights475
of action suggests that there is a public policy behind private litigation in these
instances. Often, private litigants are the only entities that can seek and obtain
legal recourse against corporations that violate the law. In that way, third
parties act as a deterrent against corporate malfeasance and vindicate the
interests of those hurt by unlawful activity.476
To counter the argument that the government is better suited for
protecting public interest, Steven B. Singer, a plaintiff’s attorney for securities
investors and shareholders, submitted comments that demonstrate the
effectiveness of third-party litigation, especially class action lawsuits, in
jurisdictions that do not recognize selective waiver.  Citing two cases477
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handled by his firm, Singer argues that third-party plaintiffs are situated as
well as, if not better than, federal agencies to vindicate public interest.  In478
Ohio Public Employees Retirement System v. Freddie Mac  and In re King479
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Securities Litigation,  Singer’s firm represented the480
“[l]ead Plaintiffs and recovered $410 million for Freddie Mac stockholders
and $38.25 million for King Pharmaceuticals stockholders.”  In each case,481
“stockholders were defrauded by the [company’s] false and misleading
statements about their financial results.”  Both defendants waived their482
privileges by disclosing internal investigation reports to government agencies
in return for lenient treatment.  The documents obtained by the lead483
plaintiffs “as a result of the waiver provided valuable insights into the frauds
and significantly strengthened the stockholders’ cases against the
defendants.”484
The third-party litigants capably uncovered illegalities and obtained
remuneration for the frauds, but the government’s investigations resulted in
no recovery for the stockholders.  Although each company agreed to pay the485
government around $125 million in civil fines, none of that money went for
the benefit of the stockholders.  Consequently, traditional waiver doctrine486
rules served their purpose of fairness: the corporation received lenient
treatment from the government, the government penalized the companies for
their actions, and the stockholders recovered for the damages they suffered
and “fulfilled their ‘private attorney general’ function.”  The companies487
could have asserted their privileges against all plaintiffs and the government,
but took a calculated risk—they decided that obtaining leniency from the
government was more valuable than the losses the companies would sustain
at the hands of third-party litigants.  Singer’s comments demonstrate that488
everyone would lose if selective waiver were adopted since third-party
litigants are, at times, the most effective check against illicit activity.
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After the comment period, the Advisory Committee determined that
nationalizing selective waiver was not the appropriate measure for protecting
corporate privileges and improving the corporate litigation milieu. The
selective waiver doctrine would have been only a stopgap for some issues and
would have violated the traditional principles behind evidentiary privilege and
waiver.
VI. FRE 502’S PROPOSAL & ENACTMENT IN 2008
Eventually, the Advisory Committee abandoned the selective waiver
provision of 502(c) since the doctrine proved to be too divisive during the
comment period and hearings.  The Advisory Committee sent its final489
proposal to Congress for endorsement of FRE 502.  The contents of FRE490
502 and possible ramifications of its enactment are discussed below.
A. Text of FRE 502
The report to Congress from the Advisory Committee’s proposed FRE
502 contained the exact same language as the final presentation submitted by
Senators Leahy and Specter before Congress.  The proposal no longer491
covered state-to-state waiver problems, but only federal-to-state issues,
meaning that it controls state rulings on disclosures initially made at the
federal level or to a federal agency.  Additionally, the Committee omitted the492
“selective waiver” provision from its submission to Congress because it
proved to be controversial during the Committee Hearings.  However, the493
Committee drafted language for a selective waiver provision if Congress
determined that it desired to have that specific language in FRE 502.494
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495. “These rules govern proceedings in the courts of the United States and before United States
bankruptcy judges and United States magistrate judges, to the extent and with the exceptions stated in Rule
1101.” FED. R. EVID. 101.
496. Applicability of Rules. “(a) . . .These rules apply to the United States district courts . . . (b) . . .
These rules apply generally to civil actions and proceedings . . . to criminal cases and proceedings, to
contempt proceedings . . . (c) . . . The rule with respect to privileges applies at all stages of all actions, cases,
and proceedings.” FED. R. EVID. 1101.
Currently, FRE 502 reads:
Rule 502. Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product; Limitations on Waiver
The following provisions apply, in the circumstances set out, to disclosure of a
communication or information covered by the attorney-client privilege or work-product
protection.
(a) Disclosure Made in a Federal Proceeding or to a Federal Office or Agency; Scope
of a Waiver.—When the disclosure is made in a Federal proceeding or to a Federal
office or agency and waives the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection,
the waiver extends to an undisclosed communication or information in a Federal or
State proceeding only if:
(1) the waiver is intentional;
(2) the disclosed and undisclosed communications or information concern the
same subject matter; and
(3) they ought in fairness to be considered together.
(b) Inadvertent Disclosure.—When made in a Federal proceeding or to a Federal
office or agency, the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a Federal or State
proceeding if:
(1) the disclosure is inadvertent;
(2) the holder of the privilege or protection too reasonable steps to prevent
disclosure; and
(3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error, including (if
applicable) following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B).
(c) Disclosure made in a State Proceeding.—When the disclosure is made in a State
proceeding and is not the subject of a State-court order concerning waiver, the
disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a Federal proceeding if the disclosure:
(1) would not be a waiver under this rule if it has been made in a Federal
proceeding; or
(2) is not waiver under the law of the State where the disclosure occurred.
(d) Controlling Effect of a Court Order.—A Federal court may order that the privilege
or protection is not waived by disclosure connected with the litigation pending before
the court—in which event the disclosure is also not a waiver in any other Federal or
State proceeding.
(e) Controlling Effect of a Party Agreement.—An agreement of the effect of
disclosure in a Federal proceeding is binding only on the parties to the agreement
unless it is incorporated into a court order.
(f) Controlling Effect of This Rule.—Notwithstanding Rules 101  and 1101,  this495 496
rule applies to State Proceedings and to Federal court-annexed and Federal court-
mandated arbitration proceedings, in the circumstances set out in the rule. And
notwithstanding Rule 501, this rule applies even if State law provides the rule of
decision.
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(g) Definitions.—In this rule:
(1) “attorney-client privilege” means the protection that applicable law provides
for confidential attorney-client communications; and
(2) “work product protection” means the protection that applicable law provides
for tangible material (or its tangible equivalent) prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial.497
B. The Potential Effects of FRE 502
The “Explanatory Note on Evidence Rule 502 Prepared by the Judicial
Conference Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules” (Revised Nov. 28,
2007), is crucial to understanding the status of the selective waiver doctrine.498
The purposes behind the rule remain constant: 1) to resolve the dispute
between courts concerning the effect of certain disclosures of privileged
information, especially relating to subject matter waiver; and 2) to lower
litigation costs due to protection of privileged information for fear of subject
matter waiver.499
The Explanatory Note claims that the rule does not “purport to supplant
applicable waiver doctrine generally.”  The central question, then, is: will500
the rule affect current selective waiver holdings specifically? The likely
answer is that courts will follow their own precedent on privilege waiver rules
for selective corporate disclosure.
1. The Potential Effect of Subsection (a)
Subsection (a) “provides that a voluntary disclosure in a federal
proceeding or to a federal office or agency, if a waiver, generally results in a
waiver only of the communication or information disclosed.”  This creates501
a presumption against subject matter waiver for privilege disclosures.502
Therefore, if a company submits to the SEC an internal investigation report
on a potential stockholder fleecing by publication of misleading, material
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information, then the company has waived its privilege as to that submission,
but not as to other privileged materials. “[S]ubject matter waiver (of either
privilege or work product) is reserved for those unusual situations in which
fairness requires a further disclosure of related, protected information, in order
to prevent a selective and misleading presentation of evidence to the
disadvantage of the adversary.”  To clarify, the Explanatory Note states,503
“subject matter waiver is limited to situations in which a party intentionally
puts protected information into the litigation in a selective, misleading and
unfair manner.”  Put another way, “a party that makes a selective, misleading504
presentation that is unfair to the adversary opens itself to a more complete and
accurate presentation.”  This rule extends to the effect of waiver in future505
federal and state proceedings.506
Generally, 502(a) allows selective, intentional waiver of attorney-client
and work product material. This is not selective waiver, it is selective
disclosure, but it can become selective waiver when read in conjunction with
subsections (d) and (e). Impliedly, subsection (a) allows for selective
disclosures, as long as those disclosures are not misleading and unfair. FRE
502 mitigates this confusion by providing a test, which might be extrapolated
as: 1) was the disclosure made during a federal proceeding or to a federal
office or agency; 2) did the disclosure include privileged materials; 3) if so,
was the disclosure selective; 4) if so, was the disclosure misleading; and 5) if
so, was the disclosure unfair? If the answer to all of those inquiries is “yes,”
then there may be a total waiver of privilege, but if any of the answers are
“no,” then the waiver is limited to the disclosure itself.
Could application of FRE 502(a) lead to a veritable catch-22 for
corporations? Assume that a court holds that all selective disclosures are
misleading and unfair as a matter of law. If the corporation disclosed some
privileged materials to a government agency during an investigation, but not
all documents, then the disclosure would be selective, misleading, and unfair.
In that case, a third party could obtain access to all of the privileged
documents. Effectively, that result would be identical to the result obtained
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when a corporation turned over all of its privileged documents to the
government agency, since voluntarily disclosed materials are not protected by
FRE 502. This paradox cannot be the intended result of the rule. Therefore,
it is likely that courts will analyze on a case-by-case basis whether a disclosure
was misleading and unfair, and presume that all selective disclosures are
misleading and unfair. Unfortunately, FRE 502(a) provides no guidance as to
what constitutes a “selective,” “misleading,” or “unfair” disclosure. Perhaps
Qwest is paradigmatic of selective, misleading, and unfair disclosures.
2. The Potential Effect of Subsection (b)
Although Subsection (b) is the most potent of FRE 502, analysis of its
language is best left to another article since any discussion within this heading
would give it too little attention.
3. The Potential Effect of Subsection (c)
Subsection (c) addresses the following problem: what happens when a
privileged disclosure is made at the state level, the information is offered into
evidence in a subsequent federal proceeding, and the state law conflicts with
federal law on the issue of waiver?  The Committee decided that a federal507
court should apply the law that is “most protective of privilege and work
product.”  Consequently, the court must apply either state or federal law,508
whichever will provide the most protective of the holder’s privilege.  This509
subsection, (c), fails to resolve this problem: what happens when the state
court determines that a subject matter waiver occurred based on a disclosure
that would otherwise meet the requirements of subsection (a)? Subsection (c)
does not refer back to subsection (a), but one can infer that if federal law is the
most protective of the privilege, then the rule under subsection (a) would
govern. To be protected from waiver, the disclosure must not be selective,
misleading, and unfair. Therefore, while a party could lose protection in state
court, it could magically retrieve its privilege shield if it could remove the
proceeding to federal court or if subsequent suits were in federal court. That
result could unintentionally provide incentive for forum shopping.
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4. The Potential Effect of Subsection (d)
Recognizing the importance of confidentiality orders, the Committee
recommended subsection (d) to limit the “costs of privilege review and
retention, especially in cases involving electronic discovery.”  The rule510
provides that a confidentiality order entered in federal court is effective in all
future proceedings in any court.  Subsection “(d) does not allow the federal511
court to enter an order determining the waiver effects of a separate disclosure
of the same information in other proceedings, state or federal.”  Consider512
what would happen if a federal court determined that a litigant waived all
protection in subsequent proceedings, perhaps for failing to satisfy the
requirements of subsection (a). Assumedly, that decision, although not binding
under the interpretation set forth in the Explanatory Note, would be upheld in
other proceedings. For example, when a court determines under subsection (a)
that a disclosure is selective, misleading, and unfair, and finds that a subject
mater waiver has occurred, subsequent courts will be likely to follow this lead.
However, the purportedly binding nature of FRE 502(a) on state courts under
FRE 502(d) has not been established since state courts are not bound by
federal evidentiary rules.
5. The Potential Effect of Subsection (e)
Subsection (e) “codifies the well-established proposition that parties can
enter an agreement to limit the effect of waiver by disclosure between or
among them.”  Concededly, “such an agreement can bind only the parties to513
the agreement.”  Hence, if parties want the agreement to bind future parties,514
then they must seek a court order to that effect under subsection (d).  This515
provision fails to address the difficulty that most confidentiality agreements
present—confidentiality agreements with the government are not airtight.
Most confidentiality agreements only require an agency to keep quiet until it
must disclose the privileged information to fulfill its statutory duties, which
means that the public can obtain the information as soon as the investigation
is unsealed or when demands for the information are registered with the
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agency. One has to wonder: if a court enters an order validating a weak
confidentiality agreement, then must the order be sustained in future
litigations? Theoretically, the answer is “no” if the agreement is not equally
binding on the parties to it in the first place—i.e. an agency cannot maintain
confidentiality if it would interfere with its duties. In addition, if the
confidentiality agreement is not unassailable, then the agreement cannot pass
as hermetically sealed in a future litigation, regardless of whether there is a
court order in place. Therefore, there is a great risk that FRE 502(e) could
become a paper tiger.
6. The Potential Effect of Subsection (f)
Subsection (f) explains that “Rule 502 must be applicable when protected
communications or information disclosed in federal proceedings are
subsequently offered in state proceedings.”  This subsection overcomes the516
tension between the proposed rule and the limitations of the FRE as laid out
in FRE 101 and FRE 1101.  Possibly, this would be enough to meet the517
preemption requirements for federalization of privilege, but that debate will
not be settled until the first state court encounters such a case.
At the very least, FRE 502 will be interpreted to protect corporations
from complete subject matter waiver when a corporation makes an inadvertent
disclosure of privileged materials. It is also possible that FRE 502 will be
interpreted in some courts to protect privileged information that is covered by
a confidentiality agreement and a court order. It is likely that courts will
construe FRE 502 as a rejection of selective waiver, in that an intentional,
misleading, selective disclosure will not be entitled to protection from third
parties. The situation could change drastically and courts could uniformly and
predictably apply the rule,  as the Committee desires, but it is more likely518
that the circuits will maintain their course. If courts stick to their plan of
developing common law privilege and waiver concepts, FRE 502 will not
leave corporate counsel in a greater state of confusion.
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C. Conclusion and Unresolved Issues
The failure of the selective waiver provision to pass the committee level
of the proposal process for FRE 502 portends the death of the selective waiver
doctrine, at least as a national rule in federal courts. Given the resounding
rejection of the doctrine in the appellate courts and state courts, it is likely that
only a few circuits will cling to it in the coming years. While the corporate
fraud of the early aught years of this century reawakened the doctrine in
scholarly commentary, the drive will probably subside.
There may be a way to make selective waiver palatable, but the failed
proposal will not resurface any time soon. In modern practice, a corporation
would gain a double benefit from the enactment of a selective waiver rule,
while government agencies would gain some insight into corporate records
(although most companies already release plenty of information to
investigators) and third parties would gain nothing. If corporations could not
receive “cooperation credit” from federal prosecutors, not just for the
surrender of privileged information, then it might ameliorate some of the ill
effects of selective waiver, or at least make it more acceptable. Since a
corporation would gain nothing from the government, a corporation’s decision
to release privileged information would only be determined by the choice
between potentially opening itself up to harsh penalties from the government
or fending investigators off under traditional rules. Under this formulation, a
corporation would have no fear of broad subject matter waiver, and third
parties could at least have the satisfaction of knowing that either the
investigating agency would not gain an advantage by having the privileged
information or the agency would come down with its full force on the
corporation if it did obtain the privileged documents. Of course, this plan
could only decrease discovery costs for a corporation if it chose to surrender
all of its information. Also, it would do nothing to lessen the burden on
investigating agencies. However, the plan would preserve the integrity of the
adversarial system in more cases, ensure that “public interest” was served with
harsher penalties, and encourage corporations to preserve their privileges,
much to the delight of in-house counsel.
Unfortunately, the problems that led many to support selective waiver are
still extant: high discovery costs, agency expectations of privilege waivers,
high investigative costs for agencies, tentative cooperation by corporations
with agencies, and the erosion of corporate privileges. Perhaps the ACPPA,
if enacted, and FRE 502 can assuage some of the fears of corporate counsel
by making “cooperation credit” a thing of the past and by limiting the
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exposure of corporation who inadvertently disclose privileged materials or
disclose in a non-misleading, non-selective fashion to federal investigators.
Yet, questions surrounding the future application of FRE 502 remain.
Among them:
1.) Will state courts honor the rulings of federal courts and obey 502(b)’s rule on
inadvertent disclosure? Moreover, can Congress constitutionally preempt state law in the
area of evidentiary privileges related to the practice of law (attorney-client privilege and
work-product doctrine)?
2.) FRE 1101(a) states that the FRE apply to federal district courts. Can Congress
override that with FRE 502(f)?
3.) Will intergovernmental sharing of privileged information from investigations violate
the “controlling effect of a party agreement” and a court order made on the viability of
that agreement under FRE 502(d) and (e)?
4.) Will FRE 502 be construed to allow selective waiver through combining FRE 502(a),
(d), and (e), or will courts hold as a matter of law that any intentional disclosure is always
selective, misleading, and unfair?519
6.) Will FRE 502 be construed as a substantive or a procedural rule? This may have
affect on its application in cases depending on whether the case is in federal court under
federal question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction.
